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I. INTRODUCTION
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 1 enacted with little fanfare
in the closing days of the Carter administration, imposes important
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (Supp. IV 1980).
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new responsibilities on agencies that declare policy through rulemak-
ing. For example, such agencies must now perform "regulatory flex-
ibility analyses" as part of the rulemaking process.2 As an additional
complication to rulemaking, the RFA represents part of a central
theme of regulatory restraint that will exist through the 1980's and that
will ensure, in the words of President Carter, that "regulation gives
Americans their money's worth." 3 In effect, Congress is now telling
the regulator to "heal thyself' through careful and cautious
policymaking.
The RFA is testimony to the political effectiveness of the small
business lobby both inside and outside of government; indeed, the
RFA was the only regulatory-analysis proposal to become law in the
regulatory-reform-minded Ninety-sixth Congress. 4 The RFA is not,
however, the only regulatory-analysis scheme to emerge from the re-
cent regulatory-reform movement. A Carter administration executive
order5 introduced the concept of regulatory analysis to executive agen-
cies and President Reagan has refined the concept with his own execu-
tive order, which mandates cost-benefit analysis. 6 The Paperwork
Reduction Act 7 reduced for all agencies the reporting burden of com-
plying with regulations. Moreover, the Ninety-seventh Congress is
considering generic regulatory-reform proposals that mandate regula-
tory analysis." Thus, the RFA is both a harbinger and microcosm of
regulatory reform.
This article is a guide to the RFA. The article explores the as-
sumptions underlying the RFA and analyzes its provisions. In addi-
tion, the article studies the RFA's relationship to other regulatory-
analysis efforts and offers suggestions for integrating the RFA into the
general scheme of regulatory reform.
II. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
The RFA is a stunning achievement for the small business com-
munity and its representatives in government because it requires virtu-
2. See notes 179-206 infra and accompanying text.
3. THE WHITE HousE, REGULATORY REFORM: PRESIDENT CARTER'S PROGRAM 2 (1980).
4. Id 26.
5. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 671 (1978), revokedby Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 601, at 124 (Supp. IV 1980).
6. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 601, at 124
(Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of the Executive Order and the RFA, see notes 228-42 infra and
accompanying text.
7. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (West Supp. 1980). For a discussion of the Act, see notes 243-54
infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 300-313 infra and accompanying text.
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ally all government policymaking to be sensitive to small business
concerns. This success is the culmination of the resistance of small
business to increasing government regulation. Because of earlier legis-
lative successes, small business was ready to take immediate advantage
of an emerging movement away from government regulation. Its posi-
tion was strengthened by the convincing argument that small business
was bearing a disproportionate share of the regulatory burden on busi-
ness and industry.
A. Historical Concerns for Small Business.
Since the passage of the Small Business Act (the Act)9 in 1953,
Congress has shown a special solicitude for the problems of small busi-
ness. The Act provided small business with assistance in receiving gov-
ernment loans, in obtaining government contracts, and in securing
technical and managerial know-how. It also established the Small
Business Administration (SBA), which was to carry out the purposes of
the Act under the direction of the President.10 The initial thrust of the
SBA was to study whether defense-procurement programs unfairly dis-
criminated against or imposed undue burdens on small business and to
recommend appropriate adjustments.'" In 1958 Congress expanded the
SBA's protective role by requiring government to transact a fair pro-
portion of its purchases and sales with small business.' 2 This legisla-
tion also permitted the use of variable size standards to define "small
business" for procurement purposes.' 3 Congress continued to recognize
the needs of small business as the impact of government grew beyond
defense procurement into other areas of the economy.14
By 1974 the overall loan, guaranty, and investment ceilings for
9. Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (1953) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)).
10. See 5 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976).
11. See Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, § 216, 67 Stat. 232.
12. Small Business Act Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-536, § 2(a), 72 Stat. 384 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
13. See id The term had previously been construed to mean firms with fewer than 500 em-
ployees. An interagency task force then determined that size standards should vary by industry.
Thus, in the case of oil refineries, it was suggested that "small" refineries would be those with
fewer than 1,000 rather than 500 employees. See S. REP. No. 1714, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8
(1958), refprintedin [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3071, 3077-78.
14. The Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 661-696 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), encouraged the creation of privately-owned small
businesses. The Small Business Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-305, § 9, 75 Stat. 666
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(d) (1976)), expanded the avaliability of grants to state agencies and to
universities for researching and counseling small business enterprises. The Housing Act of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 305, 75 Stat. 149, amended section 7(b) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(3) (1976), to permit loans to small businesses displaced by urban-renewal activity.
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small business had reached $6 billion.15 Nevertheless, the small busi-
ness constituency grew dissatisfied with the performance of the SBA.
Small business trade associations, suggesting the SBA was misman-
aged, claimed it no longer represented the small business community.
1 6
They called for the appointment of a Chief Counsel for Advocacy, cre-
ating a new position within the SBA, to serve as ombudsman to protect
the interests of small business.'7 This remarkable notion - that an
agency with a single constituency needed another organization within it
to protect the interests of that constituency - garnered the support.of
Congress within two years.
In 1976 Congress established the Office of Advocacy. The Office
would be headed by a Chief Counsel with broad powers to examine
both the needs of and the burdens on small business. 18 The Chief
Counsel's role included the evaluation of complaints against the SBA
and other federal agencies and the preparation of recommendations
concerning those complaints. Specifically, the Chief Counsel was ad-
monished to "measure the direct costs and other effects of government
regulation on small businesses; and make legislative and nonlegislative
proposals for eliminating excessive or unnecessary regulations of small
businesses."' 9
This change marked a dramatic shift of emphasis for the SBA,
from protecting small business against a harsh economy to protecting it
against a harsh bureaucracy. Undoubtedly reflecting a general discon-
tent with government regulation, 20 especially the health, safety, and en-
vironmental regulations of the 1970s, 2 1 the shift provided the
intellectual predicate for the legislation that would create the RFA four
15. Small Business Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-386 § 2(a)(3), 88 Stat. 742 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 633(c)(4) (1976)), as amended by Act of Aug. 4, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-89,
§ 101(c), 91 Stat. 553 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 633 (Supp. IV 1980)).
16. See The Regulatory FiexibilityAct: Hearings on S. 1974 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
traiye Practices and Procedures of the Senate Comna on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 142
(1977) (answers to questions by James McKevitt) [hereinafter cited as 1977Senate RFA Hearings].
17. See H. R. REP. No. 1178, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4500, 4507-08.
18. Act of June 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-305, 90 Stat. 668 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 634a-634g
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 634b(3) (1976). By this legislation the Chief Counsel was made something of
a knight-errant for small business throughout government. All government agencies and depart-
ments were directed to furnish the Chief Counsel "such reports and other information as he deems
necessary to carry out his functions." Id. § 634e.
20. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974) (requiring executive agen-
cies to consider the economic impact of certain rules and regulations on the business community).
21. See, e.g., 122 CONG. Rac. 13,781 (1976) (citing OSHA and ERISA as bills written "with-
out adequate consideration of small business problems" and which made a small business advo-
cate necessary) (remarks of Rep. Conte).
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years later.22 A Senate report to the White House in late 1979 set the
stage for this development by emphasizing that "[m]any small business
groups have suggested that SBA's only role should be to act as an advo-
cate for small business within the Federal Government. '23 The White
House Conference on Small Business, chaired by Arthur Levitt of the
American Stock Exchange, was a grass-roots organization of small
business people established to formulate.and to debate the critical is-
sues facing small business in the 1980's.24 The Conference made sixty
recommendations, many of which had a decidedly anti-regulation
thrust.25 One of the Conference's six specific policy goals for govern-
ment was the elimination or reduction of onerous regulations and re-
porting requirements. 26
It is difficult to overstate the impact the Conference had on the
White House and on Congress in the election year of 1980. In that
year four important pieces of presidentially supported small business
legislation emerged from Congress. The Small Business Economic Pol-
icy Act of 198027 mandates the coordination of all federal departments
and agencies in fostering the economic interests of small business and
requires the President to submit an annual report to Congress assessing
the impact of federal laws and policies on small business. The Equal
Access to Justice Act28 provides certain prevailing parties with recovery
of attorneys' fees, witnesses' fees, and other costs resulting from litiga-
tion against the United States. The eligible parties include those who
meet small business size and asset standards.29 The purpose of this Act
is to remove any deterrents a small business (or other qualifying liti-
gant) may face in litigating against administrative agencies.30 Further-
22. Because Congress did not confirm the first Chief Counsel, Milton Stewart, until July
1978, the Office of Advocacy did not begin its work until almost two years after Congress estab-
lished it. See generally Nomination of Milton Stewart to be Chief Counsel/or Advocacy of the SB:
Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
23. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 96TH CONG., IST SEss., DISCUSSION AND
COMMENTS ON THE MAJOR IssUES FACING SMALL BUSINESS 52 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE SELECT COMM.].
24. WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON SMALL BUSINESS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
AMERICA'S SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY 41-43 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE HOUSE
COMM'N].
25. The Report devoted 10 of its 60 recommendations to government regulation, paperwork,
and economic policies that concerned small business. See id. 53-54.
26. Id. 29.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631a-631b (Supp. IV 1980).
28. Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 203, 94 Stat. 2325 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1980) and
other sections in titles 15, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
29. The size standards exclude individuals with a net worth in excess of $1 million and busi-
nesses with a net worth in excess of $5 million or with more than 500 employees. 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
30. Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
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more, according to the SBA, the Act is to make government agencies
cautious about bringing actions against small businesses. 31 The
Paperwork Reduction Act,32 the result of a four-year effort to reduce
the paperwork burden the federal government imposes on business, 33
gives the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control over the
amount of paperwork generated by executive and independent agen-
cies. Although the Act is not limited in its effect to small business, it
was one of the specific recommendations of the White House Confer-
ence on Small Business.34 Few regulations are more strongly objected
to by the small business community than those increasing the burden of
the federal government's reporting and record-keeping requirements.35
The RFA, the fourth piece of small business legislation passed by Con-
gress in 1980,36 was a response to concerns about the differential impact
of regulation on small business, concerns central to the recommenda-
tions made by the White House Conference on Small Business. The
legislative successes of 1980 give substance to Article 1 of the Small
Business Bill of Rights: "The right to start, own, and manage a business
without government interference." 37
B. The Relationship Between Regulation and the Health of Small
Business.
1. The Importance of Small Business. The small business sector
(as defined by the SBA) constitutes about ninety-eight percent of all
nonfarm businesses and accounts for thirty-nine percent of the gross
national product.3 8 It employs over 100 million people, or fifty-eight
percent of all business employment,39 and is frequently the entry point
for new ventures, which create new jobs. Furthermore, there is reason
31. See SBA, ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1980).
32. 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3520 (West Supp. 1981).
33. A good overview of previous paperwork-reduction efforts is provided in Neustadt, Tam-
ing the Paperwork Tiger - An Experiment in Regulatory Management, REGULATION, Ja./Feb.
1981, at 28.
34. WHITE HOUSE COMM'I, supra note 24, at 53 (recommendation 43).
35. For example, the Senate Select Committee on Small Business concluded that
"[i]mproving government regulations, abolishing unnecessary regulations and reducing
paperwork are goals that can and must be met." SENATE SELECT Comm., supra note 23, at 49.
36. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1165 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 601-612 (Supp. IV 1980)).
Another important piece of small business legislation enacted in 1980 was the Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified in various sections of
15 U.S.C.).
37. See WHITE HOUSE COMM'N, supra note 24, at 49.
38. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, FACTS ABOUT SMALL BUSINESS AND THE U.S.
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 3-4 (1981).
39. Id. The SBA definitions of small businesses vary by industry and are elaborately devel-
oped in Standard Industrial Classifications. See OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS
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to believe that the rate of innovation in small businesses is higher than
in large businesses.40 Many of our most innovative high technology
companies such as those in the microprocessor industry began as small
businesses. In times of increasing world-wide competition for indus-
trial leadership, this source of technological innovation should be en-
couraged. Over the last twenty years, however, the small business
sector of the economy has shrunk in comparison with the large business
sector.4' It is probably impossible to determine the optimal portion of
the economy to be constituted by small businesses, for to some extent
the growth of a complex economy may portend a shift to larger busi-
ness entities as small businesses mature. Because there is no economic
reason for government to promulgate policies that intentionally or un-
intentionally retard small business development, government policies
unfavorable toward small business have become an increasing concern
of the small business community.42
2. Diseconomies of Regulatory Scale. The point at which a busi-
ness entity achieves economies of scale determines the optimum size of
such an entity in a competitive, free-market economy. At that point
growth is no longer necessary to produce goods more efficiently. De-
pending on the nature of the industry and its product mix, efficient size
may or may not make a firm a small business by SBA definitions. Aside
from the economic forces, often produced by government regulation,
that increase firm size, there appear to be noneconomic forces, also
often produced by government regulation, that require a firm to grow
or, rather, penalize a firm for not growing. 43
ASSOCIATION, THE STUDY OF SMALL BUSINESS, Pt. 11 (1977). Generally speaking, firms having
fewer than 500 employees or less than $5 million in sales are classified as small businesses.
40. Determining how firm size affects the rate of innovation is not an easy matter. The SBA
has conducted studies that indicate big business is less innovative than small business. See GELL-
MAN RESEARCH Assoc., INC., THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, (SBA Contract No. 2652-OA-79, Sept. 16, 1981) (Innovations per
million employees: small firms-157; large firms-64) (on file with Duke Law Library). The SBA
also recommends further study of the impact of increased merger activity on the rate of innova-
tion. See 1 U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPoRT-FY 1980, 14.
41. In 1960, small and medium size manufacturers accounted for 50% of the manufacturing
industry's assets; this portion had dropped to 33% by 1972. In 1953, 15% of the nation's gross.
private domestic investment was in small, nonfarm, noncorporate businesses, but in 1973 small
business accounted for only 7.5%. 122 CONG. REC., 15,009 (1976) (remarks of Rep. McColllster).
42. Representative McCollister's comment on government policy is interesting: "If our na-
tional policy is to promote small business, that policy is failing." See also JOEL POPKID & CO.,
STRATEGY FOR A MICRO DATA BASE FOR SMALL BUSINESS - PROGRESS REPORT, (SBA Contract
No. 2624-OA-79, Mar. 12, 1980) (on file with Duke Law Library).
43. See 1977 Senate PF4 Hearings, supra note 16, pt. 1, at 126 (testimony of Milton
Kafoglis).
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Laws and regulations, intended for both large and small firms, are
having an increasingly negative effect on the growth of small business.
This negative effect occurs in two ways: because small businesses have
fewer units of output over which to spread regulatory costs, regulatory
costs are higher per unit of output; and small businesses lack requisite
size to take advantage of economies of scale in regulatory-compliance,
personnel, and data systems.44
Tax laws and regulations are a particular problem. Representative
John McCollister of Nebraska recently highlighted the tax problems of
small business:
Perhaps the most devastating form which Federal antismall business
discrimination takes is found in the tax code. The complexity of the
code itself overwhelms small businessmen who lack trained legal and
accounting departments and can ill afford to hire high priced consul-
tants. In the area of the code's capital recovery provisions, for exam-
ple, small business typically utilizes straight-line depreciation
because they cannot afford the time or just plain cannot figure out
how to use the more complex capital recovery devices which could
give them a better tax situation. Large corporations, of course, are
able to utilize the more complicated provisions and, as a result, pay
lower effective tax rates than small businesses. As a class, the 100
largest corporations pay an effective rate up to 50 percent. Two years
ago, a congressional study of corporate tax rates found that the Na-
tion's largest 143 corporations paid an average tax rate of 23.4 per-
cent. The average rate for all corporations was 33.4 percent.45
The complexity of the tax laws inevitably seems to favor larger busi-
nesses. Although some recent reforms in the tax laws have benefitted
small businesses, 46 the overall impact continues to be negative.
Other agencies and programs that substantially burden small busi-
nesses include the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the De-
partment of Energy (DOE), the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA), and the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (ERISA).47 EPA's effluent-reduction regulations have a greaterimpact on small business than on large business because the regulations
mandate compliance techniques that are less compatible with the pro-
44. See 1977 Senate .FA Hearings, supra note 16, pt. 3, at 350-355 (remarks of Alfred
Dougherty).
45. 122 CONG. REC. 15,009 (1976) (remarks of Rep. McCollister).
46. One example is the rate reduction on taxes of capital gains, which has encouraged the
formation of venture-capital firms that invest in small business. See Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 102, 95 Stat. 186.
47. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in various sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 31,
and 42 U.S.C.).
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duction technologies of small firms.48 DOE's record-keeping require-
ments concerning oil and gas prices and volume are vague and
unintelligible.49 OSHA is faulted for its national-consensus standards,
which burden small businesses that lack technical expertise to interpret
the requirements.50 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is criticized
for promulgating unreasonable and complicated ERISA regulations
that, rather than protecting employee pension rights, have the practical
effect of terminating pension plans for employees of small businesses.5 I
Not only does the substance of regulatory laws frustrate small
business, but small business also suffers acutely, on a cost-per-unit ba-
sis, from completing reports required by the IRS and other government
agencies. 52 Studies show that the average cost of completing govern-
ment forms per employee and per dollar of sales drops dramatically as
firm size grows.53 Although the IRS is the traditional nemesis of small
business in this regard,54 the new government agencies of the 1970s
such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, OSHA, and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have refined mandatory
reporting into a fine art.55 Mandatory reporting has become a favorite
tool of government, perhaps because it is a method of shifting and dis-
persing compliance costs from the agencies to the regulated entities.
The small business community has objected to federal paperwork re-
quirements for a variety of reasons. Most objections concern the
number and complexity of reports, their lack of clarity, their frequency,
48. Small Business Impact Bill- Hearings on H 7739 and H. 10632 Before the Subcomm.
on Special Small Business Problems of the House Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
89-96 (1978) (remarks of James Miller) [hereinafter cited as SmallBusiness Impact Bill Hearings].
49. Small Business Impact Bill Hearings, supra note 48, at 314-18 (statement of Robert
Amori).
50. Id. 127-29 (statement of James McKevitt).
51. Id. at 123-24 (statement of James McKevitt).
52. The cost to small business of complying with regulations has been described as a "regres-
sive tax" because small business bears the same paperwork burden as large, multinational compa-
nies. SBA's Paperwork Measurement and Reduction Program: Hearings Before the Senate Select
Comm on SmallBusiness, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 50 (1980) (statement of Milton Stewart) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Paperwork Reduction Hearings].
53. See The Regulatory Flexibility 4ct: Joint Hearings on S. 1974 and . 3330 Before the
Subcomrn. on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 432-33 (1978) (Appendix "F").
54. It is estimated that 70% to 80% of the paperwork required of small business emanates
from the IRS and state tax agencies. Paperwork Reduction Hearings, supra note 52, at 84.
55. The SBA has estimated that small business expends 130 million man-hours annually in
filling out non-IRS forms. IRS paperwork requirements amount to 1,600 million man-hours,
more than the total employee production of General Motors. Federal Paperwork Requirements:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Regulation and Paperwork, Senate Select Comm. on
Small Business, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1979) (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
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and the need for professional help from accountants and lawyers to
complete them.56
The plight of small business is that the regulatory goals of society,
ostensibly equal in impact, disproportionately burden small business.
To some extent, small business is merely suffering the unequal conse-
quences of equal treatment expounded by Anatole France.5 7 But then,
as now, when such treatment results in serious frustration of personal
initiative, it is bound to become a subject for reform.
C. The Problem of "Deregulating" Small Business.
Much of the current "deregulation" movement has been inspired
by the small business community's unhappiness with the existing pat-
tern of regulation. Agencies and Congress are aware of the regulatory
problem of equal treatment of unequals and attempted to institute dif-
ferential reporting and compliance standards based on size, even before
the advent of the Regulatory Flexibility and Paperwork Reduction
Acts.
1. The ConceptualProblems. It would be satisfactory to almost
everyone if one could prorate the costs of every government program
according to company size.58 But the complexity of regulation makes it
virtually impossible to isolate compliance costs.5 9 Indeed, any effort to
do so would, as with attempts to design a regulatory budget, 60 embroil
government in additional regulation of an unknown magnitude.
Therefore, reform solutions have suggested releasing small businesses
from certain regulatory requirements imposed on larger businesses or a
reduction of responsibilities imposed by those requirements. But these
solutions are not problem free.
Exemption from regulation may amount to economic protection-
ism for small business, with resulting undesirable consequences. The
56. Paperwork Reduction Hearings, supra note 52, at 33-34 (statement of Milton Stewart).
Mr. Stewart, Chief Counsel for the Office of Advocacy of the SBA, refers to these objections as
small business' "paperwork lament." Id.
57. Anatole France berated "the majestic equality of the law that forbids the rich as well as
the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread." A. FRANCE, LE LYs
ROUGE 117 (1894). For the view that this criticism of law undermines impartiality of justice, see
F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 234-49 (1960).
58. Because smaller entities may "cost" more to regulate than larger entities, economies of
regulatory scale may exist both in the regulator and the regulated.
59. The State of Washington conducted one of the few empirical studies on the costs of com-
pliance with regulations. The study concluded that businesses with less than 50 employees have
inordinately higher compliance costs than those businesses with over 50 employees. COLE & SUM-
MERS, COSTS OF COMPLIANCE IN SMALL AND MODERATE-SIZED BUSINESSES, REPORT TO THE
SBA (1980). The results of this study suggest that other studies of this type, with larger sample
sizes, would be profitable. See id. 28.
60. See Eads, Harnessing Regulation - The Evolving Role of White House Oversight, REGU-
LATION May/June 1981, at 19.
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health of small business is determined not only by the number that
succeed, but also by the number that fail. To stifle the creative forces
arising from the possibility of failure may serve only to keep inefficient
entities alive. Moreover, the natural process of business growth is ham-
pered if smallness is rewarded by deregulation, because firms are then
encouraged to maintain a sub-optimal economic size.61 While discour-
aging the growth and capital formation necessary for expansion and
product development on the one hand, protective deregulation encour-
ages nonproductive organizational devices to take advantage of gov-
ernment-established firm size limitations on the other.62
Another serious problem with deregulation of small business is the
potential frustration of the substantive goals of regulation. The pur-
pose of health, safety, environmental, and consumer regulation is to
protect individuals in the public and in the work force. It is cold com-
fort to the miner who contracts black lung disease or to the textile
worker who inhales cotton dust that he is less protected because his
employer qualifies as a small business. 63 From a public policy stand-
point, protection against these kinds of hazards must be stated in abso-
lute terms, even when absolute protection is impossible despite great
expenditures. This is the lesson of OSHA's refusal, accepted by the
Supreme Court,64 to adopt cost-benefit analyses in determining accept-
able levels of worker exposure to harmful substances.
Furthermore, there is an equity problem with exempting small
business from regulation - the problem of where to draw the line. At
the margin, size standards draw meaningless distinctions, 65 but the reg-
61. Congress has been concerned about encouraging smallness for these reasons. Congress
does "not want to create any disencentives to economic growth." 126 CONG. REc. H8461 (daily
ed. Sept. 8, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Seiberling).
62. For example, the House discussion of the need for the RFA pointed out that DOE's crude
oil entitlement program allows "small refineries" to purchase crude oil at reduced prices. As a
consequence, 37 of 38 new refineries built between 1974 and 1977 were designed to process less
than 40,000 barrels per day, the threshold of the entitlements program, whereas the minimum
technologically efficient refinery size is 175,000 barrels per day. See 126 CONo. REc. H8467 (daily
ed. Sept. 8, 1980).
63. Lack of protection can occur not only because protective legislation does not to apply to
the small enterprises involved, but also because agencies internally modify enforcement resources
and reporting requirements to reflect size considerations. Also, as Representative Seiberling has
noted, Congress must be careful not to provide incentives for large business to spin off unsafe
operations into smaller businesses not subject to strict regulation. This allegedly occurred in the
case of the Allied Chemical plant in Hopewell, Virginia that was the source of keypone contami-
nation in the James River. See 126 CONG. REc. H8461 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Seiberling).
64. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).
65. What difference does it make, for example, whether a small business has 499 or 500
employees, or $4,999,000 or $5,000,000 in sales? The SBA admits that establishing size standards
for small business in the middle (or "gray") area is very difficult. The SBA apparently considers
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ulatory benefits they may carry are no less valuable. The exemption
process may therefore be arbitrary in any individual case, 66 even if
courts uphold it.67
2. Congressional andAdministrative Techniquesfor Adjusting Reg-
ulations to Size of Entity. "Tiering. " Despite conceptual difficulties,
federal statutes and regulations have long acknowledged the relevance
of size in determining their coverage. Perhaps the classic example of
this deference to size is the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption to the Civil
Rights Act of 1968,68 which renders the housing non-discrimination
provisions of the Act inapplicable to owner-occupied units of four fam-
ilies or less.6 9 In this situation, as a matter of political expediency as
well as potential impact, Congress thought it appropriate to
subordinate the public interest against discrimination to individual in-
terests in privacy.70
A series of administrative adjustments - often by the agencies
most objected to by small business - also seek to reduce the regulatory
burden on small firms. Some have taken the form of outright exemp-
tions from compliance, such as OSHA's decision to eliminate reporting
burdens for businesses with ten or fewer employees. 71 Both the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and the EPA have issued a variety of
regulations that provide specific exemptions for small business.72 In
addition, some agencies have devised innovative regulatory plans that
whether it should assist competition in given industries by including mid-sized firms within its
definitions. See Size Standards for Small Businesses: Hearings Before the Subcomm on General
Oversight andMinority Enterprise of the House Comm on Small Business, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1980) (statement of SBA Associate Administrator Roger Rosenberger).
66. Regulatory discrimination based on the size of regulated entities has withstood constitu-
tional challenges based on equal protection claims. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
67. Some courts have specifically upheld SBA size standards, see, e.g., Otis Steel Prod. Corp.
v. United States, 316 F.2d 937, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1963), and the SBA's refusal to consider affiliates of
large businesses as "small." See American Elec. Co. v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D.
Hawaii 1967); Springfield White Castle Co. v. Foley, 230 F. Supp. 77, 78-79 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2)(1976). Mrs. Murphy was the name given to the imaginary constit-
uent whose rooming house would not be subject to the law. See Civil Rights - the President's
Program: Hearings on S. 1731 and . 1750 before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 31-32 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)(1976) (excluding
accommodations of five rooms or less).
69. See, e.g., Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942, 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The question has
been raised whether this exemption also applies to the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1976). See Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303, 1304 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
70. See Note, Public Accomodations: A Justocation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
16 W. REs. L. REv. 660, 672 (1965).
71. See Paperwork Reduction Hearings, supra note 52, at 51 (statement of Milton Stewart).
72. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (1981) (exception for offerings of securities less than
$100,000); 40 C.F.R. § 21 (1981) (EPA small business exemptions).
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are intended to minimize the impact of regulations on small business. 73
For example, the EPA's bubble concept allows businesses some flex-
ibility in reducing total emissions by placing an imaginary bubble over
an entire plant and demanding only that overall emissions levels meet
established standards rather than requiring each stack within the plant
to be of the most efficient design.74
This method for adjusting government regulation to the needs of
small business is known as "tiering.' ' 75 Tiering allows an agency (or in
some instances Congress itself) to tailor regulatory requirements to fit
the particular needs of the regulated entities. The predominant method
of tiering uses the size standards promulgated by the SBA, which can
be used both in graduated stages and in a single division.76 In addition
to size standards, some agencies have determined appropriate tiers by
degree of risk, technological and economic ability to comply, geograph-
ical location, and level of federal funding.77 In 1981 the Regulatory
Council collected 190 examples of tiering permitted by fourteen execu-
tive and twelve independent agencies. 78 This trend will probably con-
tinue as agencies look for ways to meet the objections of their smaller
but increasingly influential constituents.
III. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
Though the RFA was a congressional response to the complaints
of small business about the burdens of federal regulation, its impact is
more general, as its placement in Title 5 of the United States Code
(amending the Administrative Procedure Act (APA))79 suggests.
Emerging from a broad-based concern with regulatory reform, the
RFA represents not only a triumph of regulatory analysis as a statutory
concept, but also a part of a larger, still evolving legislative trend.
73. The SEC, for example, has created an Office of Small Business Policy to review its rules
with a view towards minimizing burdens on small business.
74. See 126 CoNG. REc. S10,937 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980) (discussion in the Senate's section-
by-section analysis of the bill).
75. See generally U. S. REGULATORY COUNCIL, TIERING REGULATIONS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE (1981).
76. In fact, the White House Conference on Small Business recommended that SBA size
standards themselves be designed with multiple tiers rather than in a single division. See WHITE
HOUSE COMM'N, supra note 24, at 59 (resolution 8).
77. See U.S. REGULATORY CoUNC cl, supra note 75, at 4-6.
78. Id. 41-54.
79. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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A. A Brief Legislative Review.
Although the RFA quietly appeared at the end of the term of the
Ninety-sixth Congress, it has a lengthy and complex legislative history.
Senators Culver and Nelson first introduced a bill (S. 1974) entitled
"The Regulatory Flexibility Act" in the Ninety-fifth Congress. 80 Senate
hearings were held on the bill during 1977 and 1978, resulting in vari-
ous amendments. 81 The bill passed the Senate on October 14, 1978, but
because of a lack of activity in the House, no further action was taken
on the bill during the Ninety-fifth Congress. 2
At the beginning of the Ninety-sixth Congress, activity on regu-
latory flexibility increased. Senator Culver reintroduced his original
bill as S. 299 on January 31, 1979.83 On the same day, Representative
Ireland introduced a bill in the House entitled "The Small Business
Regulatory Relief Act, ' 84 which was similar in purpose to Senator Cul-
ver's bill but was cast as an amendment to the Small Business Act.85
The Senate and the House extensively examined their respective bills
over the next six months.8 6
Simultaneously, other independently conceived legislative efforts
were forming that related to the existing small business efforts. Two
omnibus regulatory-reform bills were introduced that applied the con-
cept of regulatory analysis to all administrative agencies. Senator
Ribicoff introduced a regulatory-reform act in the Senate and Repre-
sentative Rodino introduced one in the House.8 7 The Carter adminis-
80. S. 1974, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rc. 25,844 (1977).
81. Hearings on S. 1974 as amended were held on October 7, 1977, and August 23, 1978
before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, which unanimously and fa-
vorably reported S. 1974 to the Judiciary Committee on September 9, 1978. See S. REP. No. 1322,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
82. Representatives Kastenmeier and Baldus introduced H.R. 11,376, the House companion
bill to S. 1974 on March 8, 1978, but no action was taken on it. The House also had two other bills
on small business impact before it, but no further activity took place in the House after S. 1974
passed the Senate. See generally Small Business Impact Bill- Hearings on H.A 7739 and H..
10,632 Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the House Comm on Small
Business, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
83. S. 299, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S907 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as S. 299]. Representatives Kastenmeier, Baldus, and Harkin introduced the House compan-
ion bill, H.R. 1971, one week later. 125 CONG. REc. H556 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
84. H.R. 1745, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H404 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979).
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
86. See S. REP. No. 878, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) (accompanying S. 299); H.R. REP. No.
519, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (accompanying H.R. 4660). H.R. 4660 became the principal
House bill on which hearings centered. It was an expansion of H.R. 1745, and was introduced by
Representative Gore on June 28, 1979. 125 CONG. REC. H5420 (daily ed. June 28, 1979).
87. See S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S7128 (daily ed. June 6, 1979); H.R.
3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. H1737 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1979).
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tration also introduced a comprehensive regulatory-reform bill with
regulatory analysis as its centerpiece. 88
As this activity demonstrates, regulatory reform was a major
theme of the Ninety-sixth Congress. The number of bills and of legis-
lative days devoted to the topic formed an impressive proportion of the
Congress' work.89 After all the dust had settled, however, only the
small business reform bills survived, 90 and even those went through
considerable debate and change before becoming law.
The major Senate and House bills on regulatory flexibility9 (each
of which went through extensive hearings) differed in significant ways.
The Senate bill amended the APA; the House bill amended the Small
Business Act.92 The House bill relied more heavily on a select list of
methods (including tiering) for reducing the burden on small business,
whereas the Senate bill listed its methods as examples and required
only that the agency explain its rejection of any methods. The Senate
bill covered small governmental jurisdictions; the House bill did not.
Finally, the Senate version as introduced had a limited provision" for
judicial review, a matter the House version did not address. 93
The Senate bill, S. 299, eventually became law when the House
passed it without amendment on September 8, 1980.94 The House held
no separate hearings on the Senate bill; rather, it simply adopted the
Senate's description and section-by-section analysis of the bill.95 The
House was content with a three-page "Discussion of the Issues" that
contained the statement that the House Report on the House bill was
"incorporated by reference into the legislative history of the present
bill."' 96 That statement must be read with caution, however, because
the House bill did not become law; any conflicts in interpretation
should be resolved by a comparison of the Senate's "Description of
Major Issues"97 and the House's "Discussion of the Issues." 98 The Sen-
88. See S. 755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S3338 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1979).
89. The session also produced a comprehensive study of federal regulation. See SENATE
CoMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
90. To illustrate the popularity of small business in Congress, there has not been a single
negative vote cast against any regulatory flexibility bill, in subcommittee, in full committee or on
the floor, since the first bill was introduced in 1977. See 126 CONG. Rnc. H8470 (daily ed. Sept. 8,
1980).
91. S. 299, supra note 83, and H.R. 4660.
92. H.R. 4660 did, however, borrow the definitions of "agency" and "rule" from the APA. 5
U.S.C. § 551(l)(4) (1976).
93. See note 86 supra.
94. 126 CONG. Rlc. H8548 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980).
95. See id. H8468-80. The Senate description and analysis is set forth at 126 CoNG. REc.
S10,934-43 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
96. Id. H8468.
97. See 126 CONG. Rac. S10,934-43 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
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ate bill had reached the floor of the Senate on August 6, 1980, and had
been presented by Senator Byrd of West Virginia in the form of a sub-
stitute amendment 99 whose principal purpose was to recodify the bill
from sections 551 and 553 of title 5 to a new chapter (sections 601-
612).I1 °  It passed the Senate in that form on the same day.1'0  The
President signed the bill into law on September 19, 1980.
B. Overview of the RF4.
The RFA proceeds from an optimistic assumption: highlighting
the problems of small business and offering suggestions will allow
agencies to solve problems they have largely created, thus obviating
any need to deregulate small business through outright statutory ex-
emptions. This process of self reform assumes a receptive
bureaucracy.102
The RFA's structural limitations are crucial. It applies only to the
substantive rulemaking process under the informal rulemaking provi-
sions of the APA and of related organic legislation.10 3 Thus, by its
terms, the RFA does not apply to the vast amount of administrative
activity that is not rulemaking, whether it be adjudication or the virtu-
ally unlimited realm of informal action. 104 Moreover, it does not even
reach rulemaking that is not subject to notice and comment.'0 5 There-
fore, the RFA does not address many of the problems small business
faces with agencies such as the IRS that operate more through report-
98. See 126 CONG. REc. H8468-70 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980).
99. See 126 CONG. REc. S10,931 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980). To the extent the unprinted amend-
ment varied from S. 299, the Senate "Description of Major Issues" accompanying the amendment
may be a better source of congressional intent than the Senate report accompanying the original S.
299.
100. Id. S10,930-31.
101. Id SI0,944.
102. It is not entirely fair to evaluate agency performance historically. With increasing fre-
quency agencies have developed techniques for responding to the special problems of small busi-
ness. See text accompanying notes 71-78 supra. Moreover, the appointment process puts persons
into leadership positions whose outlooks are undoubtedly more receptive to small business
problems.
103. The RFA defines "rule" to include "any rule for which the agency publishes a general
notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant to section 553(b) of this title, or any other law." 15
U.S.C. § 601(2) (Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of these provisions, see text accompanying
notes 155-69 infra.
104. Although precise figures are impossible to obtain, estimates suggest that about 90% of
government action is informal. See Verkuil, A Study ofInformal.4djudication Procedures, 43 U.
CHi. L. REv. 739, 741 (1976).
105. Some examples of this type of rulemaking are interpretative rules, and other rules ex-
empted from 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976). Also, rules of "particular applicability" such as ratemak-
ing are excluded. 5 U.S.C. § 601(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
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ing requirements, individual actions, and interpretative rules than
through substantive rules.
The RFA does not mandate any particular outcome in rulemak-
ing. It requires consideration of alternatives that are less burdensome
to small business, but it only requires that agencies explain why those
alternatives were rejected.10 6 The RFA extends this process to agency
evaluation of existing rules over a ten-year period.10 7 Although it gives
the courts and the Chief Counsel for Advocacy some limited responsi-
bilities,10 8 it provides few express enforcement powers.
The Office of Advocacy of the SBA is to administer and to imple-
ment the RFA. This is a natural place to lodge oversight responsibility
from the point of view of the small business community, for that com-
munity looks on the Chief Counsel's office as a safe harbor in the un-
friendly world of regulation. Difficulties with the role of the Office of
Advocacy under the RFA do exist, however. The Office is clearly
small business and not small entity oriented. Thus, to the extent small
organizations and small governmental jurisdictions seek a supportive
advocate, they may not find one in the Chief Counsel. 10 9 Moreover, the
Office of Advocacy may be hard pressed to provide the kind of profes-
sional guidance to agencies that more established oversight agencies
like the OMB could provide.
The RFA adds certain steps to the typical rulemaking process.
Rulemaking under APA section 553 involves four distinct steps:
(1) publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register; (2) receipt
of written and oral comments from the public; (3) possible modification
106. The note following section 601 of the RFA states:
(b) It is the purpose of this Act ... to establish as a principle of regulatory issuance
that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the businesses,
organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation. To achieve this
principle, agencies are required to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and
to explain the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given serious
consideration.
5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 124 (Supp. IV 1980).
Section 603 requires consideration of at least four alternatives: (1) tiering; (2) clarification,
consolidation, or simplification; (3) performance rather than design standards; and (4) exemptions.
Id. 603(c).
107. Id § 610. The ten-year period may be extended, on notice, in annual increments for up
to an additional five years. Id.
108. The Office of Advocacy's best enforcement weapons are publicity through its annual re-
ports on agency compliance to the President and to Congress, id § 612(a), and through amicus
appearances in court when the rule is under review. Id § 612(b). The role of the courts on review
is very limited. See notes 270-83 infra and accompanying text.
109. The Office of Advocacy responds to its small business constituency as required by its
mandate. Other small entities either do not have equivalent advocates in government or if they
do -- education, for example - they are located in other agencies.
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of the proposed rule in light of the comments; and (4) publication of
the final rule in the Federal Register with a statement of basis and pur-
pose.' 10 Under the RFA the following additional steps must be taken:
before a proposed rule is published, the agency must prepare an Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA), which it publishes along with
the proposed rule,"I unless it certifies in the Federal Register that the
rule will not "have a significant economic impact upon a substantial
number of small entities;"' 1 2 the IRFA or the certification must be sent
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, published in the Federal Register,
and actual notice must be sent to affected small entities;" 3 during the
comment period, the agency should hold conferences and public hear-
ings on the rule as it affects small entities; 114 and, after the comment
period, the agency must prepare a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analy-
sis (FRFA) along with its final rule and statement of basis and purpose
(unless it has made a certification as noted above). The agency also has
continuing responsibilities to review the rules periodically and to pub-
lish biannual regulatory agendas." 5
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF PIVOTAL PROVISIONS
Though numerous questions arise under the RFA, 116 they cluster
around several broad inquiries: Who does the RFA cover (or what is
the meaning of "small entities")? Which agencies and rules are within
its scope? How is the certification process to be administered? What
does the regulatory-flexibility process demand? What does the agency
rule-review process contemplate? What is the role of the courts on re-
view; and what is the role of the Office of Advocacy? This article will
consider each of these inquiries in turn.
110. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
111. Id § 603(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
112. Id §605(b).
113. Id § 609(3).
114. Id. § 609(4).
115. The RFA requires that agencies publish in the Federal Register a plan for a review of
their rules within ten years. Id 610(a). Additionally, agencies must publish annually a list of
rules that significantly affect small entities and that will be reviewed during the succeeding year.
Id. § 610(c). This latter requirement may be viewed as an additional procedure imposed on sec-
tion 553 rulemaking.
116. Milton Stewart, the first Chief Counsel for Advocacy, has published a useful introduction
to the RFA that answers some preliminary questions. Stewart, The New Regulatory Flexibility
Act, 67 A.B.A.J. 66 (1981). The recently confirmed Chief Counsel, Frank Swaim, is a former
counsel to the National Federation of Independent Business, and like Mr. Stewart, was active in
the legislative efforts that produced the RFA.
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A. The Defnitional Components of "Small Entities. "
The RFA is law because of the support it received from small
business, whose needs are its obvious focus. Yet its definitional section
subsumes small business within the term "small entity," a term that
also includes "small organizations" and "small governmental jurisdic-
tions."117 These latter two terms greatly.expand the potential coverage
of the RFA, but they also introduce substantial definitional difficulties.
The term "small business" has generally accepted meanings, estab-
lished by the SBA; the RFA incorporates those meanings by reference.
Moreover, the RFA requires any agency that seeks to alter the estab-
lished definition of "small business" first to consult with the Office of
Advocacy and to allow an opportunity for public comment." l8 Because
the established definition of small business relates to loan and procure-
ment functions, 119 there may be a tendency for agencies to seek new
definitions for RFA purposes. While this may complicate the task of
the Office of Advocacy, 20 careful consultation between agencies and
the Office of Advocacy can produce more useful definitions.' 2 '
The two other definitional categories - small organizations and
small governmental entities - are not familiar to agencies and the Of-
fice of Advocacy does not have the same consultative role with respect
to their formulation. Thus, problems of coverage will undoubtedly
emerge as individual agencies attempt to define these terms.
1. The Meaning of "Small Organizations." Section 601(4) of the
RFA provides:
[Tihe term "small organization" means any not-for-profit enterprise
which is independently owned and operated and is not dominant in
its field, unless an agency establishes, after opportunity for public
comment, one or more definitions of such term which are appropri-
ate to the activities of the agency and publishes such definition(s) in
the Federal Register .... 122
117. 5 U.S.C. § 601(3)-(6) (Supp. IV 1980).
118. Id. §601(3).
119. See note 39 supra.
120. The former Chief Counsel indicated a preference to retain established meanings of
"small business." See Stewart, supra note 116, at 67.
121. The SEC provides a good example of successfully creating new definitions of"small busi-
ness" and "small organization" as applied to securities issuers and registrants of securities ex-
changes. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 46 Fed. Reg. 19,251 (1981). The SEC had a
productive exchange of views with the Office of Advocacy concerning the new definitions. See
Letter from A. J. Prendergast, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy, to George Fitzsimmons, Secre-
tary of the SEC (May 27, 1981). The SEC also requested public comments on whether its rules
would have a "significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities." 46 Fed.
Reg. 19,251 (1981).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 601(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
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(a) Legislative guidance. The "Description of Major Issues"
and the section-by-section analysis that accompanied the Senate dis-
cussion on the RFA123 (and which the House incorporated by refer-
ence)'24 discuss the small organization concept and take the general
approach that an agency applying them is to be "guided by the same
considerations which were used in developing the definition of small
business."' 25 The Senate analysis lists three such considerations: a
business must be (1) independently owned and operated; (2) not domi-
nant in its field; and (3) must fall within the SBA size standards. 126 The
last consideration is applicable to small organizations only by
analogy.127
There are only a few potential small organizations actually named
in the Senate analysis. It lists the YMCA/YWCA and the Boy
Scouts/Girl Scouts simply to indicate that their nationwide status does
not automatically disqualify them as small organizations 12 8 on the
ground that they are dominant in their field.129 The House did not
discuss any examples in its section-by-section analysis of its bill; fur-
thermore, the House bill's definition of "small organization" varies
from that which became law: it included "unincorporated businesses"
and "sheltered workshops" as well as non-dominant, independent,
nonprofit enterprises. 30 One must question whether the House defini-
123. 126 CONG. REc. S10,934-43 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
124. See 126 CONG. REc. H8468 (daily ed. Sept. 8, (1980)). See notes 96-97 supra and accom-
panying text.
125. 126 CONG. REC. SI0,940 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
126. Id.
127. SBA size standards concerning number of employees (under 500) or dollar amount of
sales (under $5,000,000) may or may not be useful standards in nonprofit organizations.
128. 126 CONG. REc. S10,940 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980). The section-by-section analysis indi-
cates that these organizations should be tested by other criteria such as structure and operating
characteristics at the local level, organizational resources, and ability to comply with rules and
reporting requirements. This latter characteristic seems to confuse definitional problems with sub-
stantive ones, and serves to highlight the difficulties agencies will face in applying the small organ-
ization standard.
129. "Dominance" is to be given a "liberal" interpretation so as not to disqualify nonprofit
organizations. Id.
130. See H.R. 4660, § 210(2), dircussed in H.R. REp. No. 519, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30
(1979). An earlier draft of S. 299 contained definitional terms similar to those in H.R 4660. See S.
299, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. S907 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979). This language also
appeared in earlier bills. See S. 3330, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S11,499 (daily ed.
July 21, 1978); S. 1974, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 25,844 (1977). The Senate Judiciary
Committee eliminated those terms from S. 299 when its Committee reported the Bill on May 5,
1980. This may turn out to be a distinction without a difference in practice, however, because
unincorporated businesses are likely to be picked up in the definition of small business, and shel-
tered workshops may simply be included within the overall definition of small organization.
Given the generous nature of the definition section, there apparently is no intent to exclude these
two types of organizations from coverage under the RFA.
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tions can be used in the unlikely event of definitional conflicts.
Further examples of what Congress intended "small organiza-
tions" to include are hard to find in the legislative hearings. The only
category of small organizations that is mentioned is that of colleges
and universities. In the hearings on S. 1974, the predecessor to the bill
enacted, Thomas 0. James, a representative of the National Associa-
tion of College and University Business Officers, testified about the
need small colleges - defined as having approximately 2,000 students
and annual budgets of under $15 million - had for relief from federal
regulations. 131 After his prepared statement, James had the following
inconclusive exchange with Senator Culver, the chief sponsor of the
Senate bill:
SENATOR CULVER. As you read them, Dr. James, do you think
that the definitions in the bill of a small business and a small organi-
zation include small universities?
DR. JAMES. Yes, I do.132
In the hearings on S. 299, Sheldon Steinbach, General Counsel of
the American Council on Education, submitted a written statement
that supported the bill but that also urged that the bill "be amended to
include colleges and universities."' 133 The bill became law without the
amendment. Thus, it is not obvious that colleges and universities are
within the definition of small organizations or, if they are, whether only
some of them are "small" under the above standards. On the other
hand, given the paucity of discussion about the term "small organiza-
tions," colleges and universities, like other possible candidates for cov-
erage (museums, charities, foundations, and the like) should be free to
make arguments derived from the definition of "small organization."
In addition, colleges and universities can argue that coverage is consis-
tent with the RFA's apparent purpose of including small concerns that
fall outside the definition of small business. 134
(b) Theproblems of applying the definition of colleges and universi-
ties. Despite some question about the meaning of the term "small or-
ganization," there will undoubtedly be assertions that it applies to
colleges and universities. 135 Problems with many kinds of regulations
131. 1977 Senate RFA Hearings, supra note 16, at 46 (statement of Thomas 0. James).
132. Id. 49. Notice that S. 1974 contained a definition of small organization that was different
from that which ultimately emerged from S. 299. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
133. Letter from S. Steinbach, American Council on Education, to Senator Culver, (Sept. 24,
1979), reprinted in Regulatory Refonr" Hearings on S. 104, S. 262, S. 299, S. 75 and S. 1291 Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 212-13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate RFA Hearings].
134. See text accompanying notes 123-26 supra.
135. Sheldon Steinbach, General Counsel of the American Council on Education, mailed a
memorandum on November 5, 1980 to college and university presidents that asserted that all
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in recent years have made the educational sector a strong ally of regu-
latory restraint. 136 The Department of Education has published its def-
inition of those colleges and universities that fall under the RFA. 137
This definition is relevant in all proceedings before that agency and
will presumably influence other agencies. The definition, which se-
verely circumscribes the meaning of "small organization," serves to
highlight some of the problems the educational establishment will face
in arguing for coverage under the RFA.
The Department's definition of "small institution of higher educa-
tion" includes all accredited colleges, public and private, that have a
full-time equivalent student enrollment of fewer than 500 or an overall
student population of fewer than 550.138 This very narrow definition
includes only twenty to twenty-five percent of all higher educational
institutions and affects less than 2.5% of all students in higher educa-
tion. Based on students affected, the definition creates a virtually de
minimis category.139
The main problem with the small organization definition is that it
does not appropriately categorize colleges, universities, and nonprofit
institutions. For example, the language borrowed from the small busi-
ness definition - "not dominant in its field" - makes the small organ-
ization definition difficult to apply. The question immediately arises
whether any college or university is dominant in its field. Certainly
some are prestigious and others are relatively large, but none would
seem to qualify as dominant in the business or antitrust sense. Unlike
independent and public colleges and universities are covered by the RFA (memorandum on file
with Duke Law Library.)
136. The latest record-keeping and reporting requirements imposed by government agencies
have been particularly burdensome for higher education. Problems include OSHA handicap-ac-
cess regulations and ERISA pension regulations. See Steinbach letter, supra note 133. Perhaps no
regulation has caused more consternation than OMB's Regulation A-21, which requires each
faculty member's professional time to be accounted for and recorded on a periodic basis. See 44
Fed. Reg. 12,368 (1979) (revision of Federal Management Circular 73-8).
137. 46 Fed. Reg. 3920 (1981).
138. Id. at 3920 (1981). The Department circulated the proposed definition for public com-
ment as required by the RFA. Although the comment period expired in February 1981, the defi-
nition has not yet been revised or promulgated. Recently the Department certified that small
colleges and universities would not be significantly affected by a proposed rule that changed the
reporting requirements for National Defense Student Loans. 47 Fed. Reg. 908,910 (1982). The
Department made no reference to its proposed size standards.
139. Comments received by the Department of Education on its proposed size standards have
criticized its approach. See, eg., Letter from Christine Milliken, General Counsel, National Asso-
ciation of Independent Colleges and Universities (Feb. 17, 1981); Letter from Sheldon Steinbach,
General Counsel, American Council on Education (Feb. 17, 1981) (stressing that the narrowness
of the standard defeats the purpose of the statute). Other commentators have argued for including
all higher educational institutions within the definition. See Letter from Clauston Jenkins, Execu-
tive Assistant, North Carolina State University to U.S.D.E. (Feb. 9, 1981).
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businesses, prestigious colleges and universities do not expand capacity
to assert their dominance and to drive other institutions out of the mar-
ket.14° Thus, the dominance question is more appropriately resolved
along the lines suggested in the Senate section-by-section analysis for
other national nonprofit organizations. 14'
On the other hand, there are significant differences in size among
colleges and universities. For example, one can draw distinctions
based on asset or endowment size.142 The assumption would be that
those institutions with large endowments have more resources to com-
ply with the regulations, an argument familiar to small business. 143 If
one adds public institutions to this list on the ground that state funding
guarantees their endowments, one can draw several significant defini-
tional lines. If colleges and universities as a group are suffering from
disproportionate regulatory burdens, however, then including all of
them in the definition of small organization would better carry out the
purpose of the RFA.
This discussion raises two points. First, when an individual
agency decides to define "small organization," it should not necessarily
use a dominance test. 44 Second, the definition is only for purposes of
determining jurisdiction under the RFA. Although deemed to be
within the RFA definition of a small organization a college might still
be exempted when the agency promulgates any resulting rules. Tiering
concepts, for example, may usefully discriminate between large, well-
140. Prestigious private universities have a national dominance in the sense that students pre-
fer them to other schools. But their prestige is measured more by the number of students they
reject than by the number they accept. Although such universities experience some growth over
time, they clearly do not grow to meet demand. State universities are somewhat different. In the
last twenty years, there has been enormous growth in public-sector higher education because of
unmet demand for higher education. With but a few important exceptions, public universities do
not have national dominance, and even those that could rival the private universities are restricted
by residency requirements. Thus unless one were to define states as sub-markets for educational-
dominance purposes, it would be difficult to label public institutions as dominant.
141. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
142. Information on endowment size is readily available for the educational sector and the
foundation sector. See, eg., INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 709 (1982). By this measure, there
are some clearly "dominant" institutions.
143. One cannot ignore that some institutions are better situated to comply with federal regu-
lations than others. Concerning competition for federal grants and contracts, for example, those
institutions that have achieved some economies of scale (because of research-grant size) have es-
tablished offices funded by overhead charges that can produce the reports and records necessary to
obtain and retain lucrative funding. In this sense, "research universities" as a category may be
distinct from colleges whose primary role is teaching.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 601(4) (Supp. IV 1980) introduces two stages: (1) a definition of small organ-
ization that controls unless (2) an agency after public comment establishes and publishes defini-
tions appropriate to the activities of the agency. There is nothing in the RFA or its legislative
history that limits the second stage to the standards contained in the first.
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endowed universities and small tuition-dependent colleges for purposes
of particular regulations. The relevance of size standards changes ac-
cording to the substantive goal of the regulation. 145 The purpose of the
RFA is to aid as many small entities as possible by reducing the bur-
dens of regulation. Definitions that include more entities at the outset
and thereby allow agencies to address particular problems of the enti-
ties within the regulatory-flexibility context are much more likely to
meet the RFA's corrective purpose.
2. The Meaning of "Small Governmental Jurisdiction." Section
601(5) of the RFA states:
[The term "small governmental jurisdiction" means governments of
cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand, unless an
agency establishes, after opportunity for public comment, one or
more definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities
of the agency and which are based on such factors as location in
rural or sparsely populated areas or limited revenues due to the pop-
ulation of such jurisdiction, and publishes such definition(s) in the
Federal Register .... 146
This definition is more precise than the definition of "small organiza-
tion" and should not create as many interpretative difficulties. 147  It
names the entities covered and establishes an objective population size
limit of 50,000. Should an agency choose, after public comment, to
establish its own definition, it is constrained by the explicit factors men-
tioned above. 148 The legislative background to this definition is less
extensive than the legislative history of the term "small organization,"
but it does reveal one important change. The definition did not appear
in the original Senate bill introduced by Senator Culver in August
1977,149 but appeared later with the threshold population initially set at
145. Some universities are better able to comply with reporting and record-keeping require-
ments than others. Size of student body, size of faculty, and annual budget should all be factors in
deciding whether to tier the requirements of the rule. The rule itself will suggest when this is
appropriate. If the rule involves reporting requirements concerning government grants and con-
tracts, for example, the amount awarded per college or university is a relevant basis for
differentiation.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 601(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
147. One complication may occur if public universities and colleges (failing to qualify under
the "small organizations" standard because they are unincorporated, nonprofit institutions) in-
stead seek to be included in the definition of "small governmental jurisdiction." The latter defini-
tion does not discuss higher educational institutions, but an agency may be able to include them as
part of a separate definitional scheme.
148. Finding the RFA definition of small governmental jurisdictions. inappropriate, the De-
partment of Education undertook to define small local educational agencies in a manner that
would "better carry out the intent of the Act." 46 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3921 (1981). Its definition,
based on number of students (fewer than 1,500), has not been adopted.
149. See S. 1974, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 25,844 (1977).
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100,000.150 There was no discussion in the Senate of the change of the
threshold population level from 100,000 to 50,000.151 One might infer
from this change that Congress sought to limit the number of govern-
mental jurisdictions that could take advantage of the RFA.
Population size will not always be a critical variable, however, and
even when it is, the Senate section-by-section analysis seems to reduce
its impact. The analysis states: "Definitions established by an agency
need not adhere strictly to the 50,000 population standards nor are they
restricted to the types of requirements the agency may impose under a
rule affecting governmental jurisdictions."1 52 This explanation ap-
pears to give some freedom to agencies to include governmental juris-
dictions with populations above the 50,000 level as small entities. The
iiaplication of the legislative history is, however, to exclude such juris-
dictions if they approach a population of 100,000.
B. Agencies and Rules Covered by the RFA.
The RFA borrows the APA's definition of "agency"15 3 and, like
the APA, casts a wide net over virtually all government agencies. Even
the SBA is within the jurisdiction of the RFA. The ultimate question
of coverage under the RFA, however, is whether the rules promulgated
by the agency are within the scope of the RFA,154 not whether the
agency itself is subject to the Act. Much debate can be expected on this
question.
Some agencies will consider themselves exempt from the RFA's
coverage because they do not promulgate rules pursuant to section 553
of the APA "or any other law."155 Problems arise when agencies, the
150. S. 3330, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(g)(4)(A), 124 CONG. REc. 51,499 (daily ed. July 21,
1978). This definition was added to S. 1974 when it passed the Senate on October 14, 1978. See
text accompanying note 82supra. When S. 299 was introduced, it contained the same definition as
that in S. 1974. See S. 299, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S907 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979).
151. The 100,000 population threshhold was stiff in S. 299 when it was reported by the Senate
Judiciary Committee on May 5, 1980. See S. RaP. No. 878, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980). The
population level was changed to 50,000 only in Senate Unprinted Amendment No. 1502, see 126
CONG. REc. S10,931-33 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980), which served as a substitute for S. 299 and passed
the Senate on August 6, 1980. Id. S10,944.
152. 126 CONG. REc. S10,934, S10,940 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
153. See 5 U.S.C. § 601(1) (Supp. IV. 1980) ("the term 'agency' means an agency as defined in
Section 55 1(1) of this title").
154. Thus, during the legislative hearings, some of those agencies that did not promulgate
rules pursuant to section 553 of the APA, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, took no interest
in the RFA. See Letter of Stansfield Turner to Senator Eastland (Jan. 19, 1978), reprinted in The
Regulatory FlexibilityAct: Joint Hearings on S. 1974 and S. 3330 Before the Subcomm. onAdminis-
trative Practice and Procedure, Senate Comma on the Judiciary and Senate Select Comm. on Small
Business, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 294 (1978).
155. 5 U.S.C. § 601(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
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public, or the Office of Advocacy disagrees about whether some agen-
cies must comply with section 553 or whether such "other law" (includ-
ing perhaps procedural regulations) exists.
1. What is a Section 553 Rule? Section 553(a) of the APA ex-
empts military or foreign-affairs functions from its rulemaking notice
and comment requirements. 156 This exemption suggests that the De-
partment of Defense and the State Department are excluded from the
RFA's coverage, unless those agencies have organic legislation that re-
quire particular rules to be published for comment. APA rulemaking
requirements also do not apply to agency rules on matters relating to
agency management and personnel or to public property, loans, grants,
benefits or contracts.157 The RFA modifies this exemption by its defini-
tion of "rule," which specifically includes federal grants to state and
local governments for which the agency provides opportunity for pub-
lic comment.158
Section 553 of the APA contains other exemptions from its notice
and comment requirements that should cause even greater consterna-
tion. Interpretative and related kinds of rules are exempted from the
notice and comment requirement as are rules the agency exempts for
good cause. 159 Concerning the former exemption, there may be some
rules that an agency can validly exempt from notice and RFA require-
ments if they are clearly of the policy-oriented, interpretative variety.
The RFA was, after all, designed to cover substantive rules that affect
small entities. But frequently it is difficult to determine whether an
interpretative rule is substantive in effect. 160 Subsequently, an agency
156. Id § 553(a)(1) (1976).
157. Id § 553(a)(2).
158. Id § 601(2) (Supp. IV 1980). This modification is difficult to justify; it partially reiterates
the exemptions of the APA that the American Bar Association and the Administrative Conference
of the United States are on record as opposing. See 3 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, 3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 53 (Jan. 1, 1973 - June 30, 1974) (resolu-
tion no. 2). Agencies that have voluntarily assumed notice and comment obligations in these
situations alleviate the problem to some extent. These agencies may balk, however, at voluntarily
assuming the additional responsibilities imposed by the RFA; there is some question whether they
are bound to assume those responsibilities. See notes 164-65 infra.
159. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976) provides in part:
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply -
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
160. See Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption ofInterpretive Rules and Policy State-
ments, 75 MICH. L. REv. 521,545-53 (1977). Of particular concern to the intended beneficiaries of
the RFA is the fact that the Treasury Department considers most IRS regulations to be of the
interpretative variety.
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may have problems ascertaining (when it establishes its regulatory
agenda, for example) whether a particular rule is subject to the RFA.
The drafters of the RFA apparently did not fully contemplate the
use of the good-cause exception to notice and comment procedures, a
loophole that has fallen into disfavor in recent years with Congress and
commentators. 16 Congress surely would not have provided agencies
with such a convenient escape from regulatory-flexibility analyses;
therefore, any agency that uses the good-cause exception for that pur-
pose should be closely scrutinized by the SBA's Office of Advocacy.
Agencies at the edge of compliance, whether because of the interpreta-
tive rule or good-cause exceptions, should be wary of opting out of the
RFA process.
2. The Meaning of "Other Law. " Two problems arise when de-
fining "other law." The first is whether "other law" includes agency
regulations as well as legislation.162 Neither the RFA nor its legislative
history answer this question; instead, one must seek guidance from re-
lated areas of administrative law. In many other situations regulations
are regarded as law. 63 Such examples may be less persuasive in this
context since Congress could have been more precise in the wording of
the RFA. Nevertheless, agencies which voluntarily impose notice and
comment requirements on themselves by regulation' 64 should be sub-
ject to RFA requirements although they would not have been subject to
these requirements had they not promulgated such procedural regula-
tions. 65 Each agency so situated can certainly abrogate its RFA re-
sponsibilities by revoking its procedural regulations. As a practical
policy matter, however, that may be difficult to do. Moreover, in many
situations the reasons that lead an agency to adopt notice and comment
procedures -by regulation apply equally to the performance of regula-
tory-flexibility analyses.
161. Several recent statutes have narrowed the applicability of the exemptions. See, e.g., The
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1262(e)(1) (1976); Poison Prevention Packaging
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1474(a) (1976). Professor Davis has recommended that this exemption be nar-
rowed or eliminated. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 6.01 (1972).
162. See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
163. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 59 (1976). Professor Schwartz cites regula-
tions regarding river navigation, air traffic control, ICC safety rules and fish and game rules as
examples of regulations that are routinely enforced in the same manner as statutes. Id. 157-60.
164. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) (the predecessor of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services), for example, voluntarily submitted its rulemaking to
the notice and comment provisions of section 553. See 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971).
165. See National Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The
N. W.. O. court remanded a rule, which was subject to HEWs voluntary acceptance of notice and
comment requirements, for failure to provide adequate factual findings. Had HEW not volunta-
rily undertaken to provide notice and comment, its rule presumably would not have received less
scrutiny.
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The "other law" problem is also raised when Congress imposes
notice and comment responsibilities by statute on an agency that is
otherwise free from the requirements of section 553 of the APA. One
such agency is the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), which
supervises government contracts. Ordinarily government contracts are
exempt from the notice and comment provisions of section 553 but the
Administrator of the OFPP is required by statute to establish "criteria
and procedures for an effective and timely method of soliciting the
viewpoints of interested parties to comment." 166 The Administrator
promulgated procedural regulations under this provision that provide
for notice of rulemaking and an opportunity to comment. 167 Thus,
both the statute and the regulations would seem to be "other law" for
RFA section 601 purposes.
To some extent this automatic application of the RFA to procure-
ment regulations may come as a surprise to Congress and to the Execu-
tive branch because they have long wanted to keep the government-
contracting process free from extensive procedural entanglements. In
fact, for this reason (among others) Congress did not make the provi-
sions of section 553 of the APA directly applicable to procurement reg-
ulations 168 and the Carter administration excluded the OFPP from
Executive Order 12,044.169 Nevertheless, the definition of "rule" in sec-
tion 601 of the RFA does not allow for individualized exceptions based
on the "other law" requirement. It is likely that other agencies will also
find themselves caught by the RFA in this fashion.
C. The Certjication Process.
The RFA contains an escape clause so that even if it applies to the
particular agency in question the regulatory-flexibility analysis still
may not be required. Section 605(b) provides:
Sections 603 and 604 of this title shall not apply to any proposed or
final rule if the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not, if
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial
166. 41 U.S.C. § 405(d)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
167. See 41 Fed. Reg. 34,324 (1976).
168. The legislative history of the statute that created the OFPP indicates a concern that notice
and comment procedures be "effective and timely." Congress therefore left it to the administrator
to evaluate the "benefits and burdens of notice and comment rulemaking." See H.R. REP. No.
1176, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1979). Once OFPP promulgated procedural regulations it presuma-
bly decided that the benefits of notice and comment procedures outweighed the burdens, but it did
not do so in light of the RFA.
169. See 43 Fed. Reg. 12,665 (1978). The extension of the Executive Order to OFPP was
thought unnecessary, because the Office had issued procedural regulations. The Reagan adminis-
tration's Executive Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, reprintedin 5 U.S.C. app., § 601, at 124
(Supp. IV 1980), contains no such exemption.
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number of small entities. If the head of the agency makes a certifica-
tion under the preceding sentence, the agency shall publish such cer-
tification in the Federal Register, at the time of publication of
general notice of proposed rulemaking for the rule or at the time of
publication of the final rule, along with a succinct statement explain-
ing the reasons for such certification, and provide such certification
and statement to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Busi-
ness Administration.' 70
Sections 603 and 604 prescribe the initial and final regulatory-flexibility
analyses that are the chief tools of the RFA. Because agencies will un-
doubtedly try to avoid compliance with sections 603 and 604 by invok-
ing section 605(b), the latter section is bound to be the source of much
controversy.
The meaning of "significant economic impact upon a substantial
number of small entities" is crucial to the RFA's implementation. In-
deed, unless the phrase is satisfactorily defined the RFA will be a nul-
lity.' 7' That the words "significant" and "substantial" were both used
provokes the question whether a different meaning is implied by the
choice of two words that are otherwise synonymous. For the RFA to
operate effectively, considerable attention must be given to the meaning
of these terms.
1. Legislative Background to the Cert/fication Process. There is
little discussion of the phrase "significant economic impact on a sub-
stantial number of small entities" in the earlier legislative reports, but
the phrase did receive attention from the Senate and the House in the
reports accompanying S. 299.172 The Senate stated that any attempt to
define the term "significant economic impact" more precisely might be
"counterproductive"; 73 it also emphasized that in deciding what the
170. 5 U.S.C. § 605(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
171. To date, most agencies appear to utilize the certification process for the vast majority of
RFA dispositions. In the period July 1, 1981 to October 1, 1981, the Office of Advocacy logged
489 RFA dispositions; 412 were certifications, 19 were IRFA's, 18 were periodic (six month) re-
views. The remainder were statements that the RFA did not apply at all. Statement of Frank S.
Swaim, Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA, before the Subcomm. on Export Opportunities
and Small Business Problems of the House Comm. on Small Business (Oct. 7, 1981) at 16.
172. The phrase appeared in S. 299 as it was reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee on
May 5, 1980. See S. 299, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S10,931 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
Earlier Senate and House bills also contained this wording. See S. 1974, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3(5), 123 CONG. REc. 25,844 (1977); H.R. 7739, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 123 CONG. REC. 18,620
(1977); H.R. 4660, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 207(b) 125 CONG. REc. H5420 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1979).
With slightly different phraseology, this wording appeared in the Senate omnibus regulatory re-
form bill, S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 634, 125 CONG. REc. S19,039 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1979).
The omnibus reform bill stipulated that no regulatory flexibility analyses would be required if the
agency determined that "the rule will not, if implemented, have an adverse effect on a substantial
number" of small entities. Id
173. 126 CONG. Rc. SI0,943 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980) (section-by-section analysis).
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term "substantial number" meant, the agencies should consider the to-
tal number of firms affected, not the percentage of affected firms in the
industry.1 74
The House, devoting a substantial portion of its three-page discus-
sion of the issues to definitional problems, 175 stated that "the term 'sig-
nificant economic impact' is neutral with respect to whether such
impact is beneficial or adverse."' 76 Thus, a rule's potential benefit to
small entities does not discharge an agency from the regulatory-flex-
ibility process since the agency does even more for them. The House
discussion also addressed the question of what constitutes a "substan-
tial number of small entities," concluding that "clearly, any antici-
pated rulemaking which common sense would suggest could have a
direct, noticeable impact on several thousand or more small entities (of
any type)"'177 should be included within the definition. The discussion
continued with speculations on the numbers and percentages that
might satisfy the term "substantial number":
For example, if there were 500 small organizations of a certain
description, and 200 of them would face major new reporting re-
quirements if a certain rule were implemented, then the rule should
be expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities (in this case small organizations). If there
were only 25 small businesses in an industry dominated by 12 large
businesses, then a rulemaking initiative which would threaten the ec-
onomic viability of 15 of those small businesses, and thus adversely
affect competition and industrial concentration, would have a "sig-
nificant economic effect on a substantial number of small entities"
within the meaning of the legislation, even though the absolute
number of small businesses involved would be minuscule. 178
Finally, the report indicated that "economic impacts include effects on
competition and economic concentration," thus suggesting that anti-
trust market analysis may be relevant.' 79
2. Administrative Implementation of the Certification Pro-
cess. There are two basic questions that will arise each time an
agency decides whether to certify a rule under section 605(b): what is a
"significant economic impact," and how many entities constitute a
174. Id In its discussion, the Senate appeared to equate "overwhelming percentage" with
substantial number, although it refused to constrain itself with any particular definition.
175. 126 CONG. REc. H8468 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980).
176. Id This interpretation is suggested by earlier drafts of the certification section that had
used the term "substantial adverse" impact and that settled on "substantial impact." See S. 2147,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 634, 125 CONG. REc. S19,039 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1979).
177. 126 CONG. R1c. H8469 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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"substantial number"? The questions are interrelated and must be ad-
dressed together in the certification process.
In making a section 605 certification, certain steps must be fol-
lowed. The certification must be made by an agency head (or his dele-
gate) and must be published in the FederalRegister with a statement of
reasons accompanying the notice of proposed rulemaking (if the certifi-
cation is made at that time).180 The agency may decide not to make the
certification at this stage because of the uncertain impact on small enti-
ties; instead, it will publish an initial regulatory-flexibility analysis. 181
This analysis may be the best way to determine the impact of a particu-
lar rule on small entities, because those entities that consider them-
selves in that category are permitted to address that question during the
comment period. Once a certification is made, it must be forwarded to
the SBA's Office of Advocacy. 182 Although the Chief Counsel of Ad-
vocacy is given no particular approval role, he may object to the certifi-
cation. According to the House report, his objections should be given
"the utmost serious consideration."'' 83
(a) The meaning of '"sgn4cant economic impact. " The purpose
of this phrase is to identify a regulation's costs or benefits to small enti-
ties. Costs should be isolated and measured. For example, an agency
should consider an analysis of market share before and after the rule.
Obviously, a rule that would drive small entities out of a given market
would have a significant impact, as would a rule that jeopardizes their
competitive position vis-a-vis large businesses. Other costs, so long as
they are economic, should be considered. Costs of compliance with the
regulation, for example, can be determined on an absolute and on a
percentage-of-revenue basis. Reporting requirements may necessitate
reorienting the workload of existing personnel or engaging outside pro-
fessional assistance. 84 The agency should consider each cost and the
net effect of all the costs resulting from the proposed rule.
Assessing the significance of these costs is naturally a subjective
process; it is very difficult in the abstract to set objective standards.
Compliance costs that equal a small business' profit margin - five to
ten percent of annual sales - would satisfy most business definitions of
"significant." If small businesses can reasonably say that the proposed
180. 5 U.S.C. § 605(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
181. See id § 603.
182. Id. § 605(b).
183. 126 CONG. REc. H8469 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980).
184. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, INCORPORATING REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
INTO THE REGULATION PROCESS: INTERiM GUIDANCE 6 (Dec. 1980) [hereinafter cited as OMB
INTERiM GuiDAN CE].
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rule would significantly reduce their profit margin, then an agency, act-
ing within the broad mandate of the RFA, should consider the costs
"significant." The significance of the impact on small organizations
and governmental jurisdictions will also best be determined on the ba-
sis of economic cost. Such additional costs must be considered in light
of current operational costs in the particular field.
(b). The meaning of "substantial number of small entities. " This
aspect of the definition is slightly less subjective, because agencies can
utilize simple arithmetic to reach a definition of "substantial number."
The first step is to calculate the total number of entities affected by the
rule; if that number is in the thousands, legislative history (and com-
mon sense) would designate it substantial. Because the absolute num-
bers will frequently not be so high, the agency should evaluate other
factors, including the ratio of small and large entities affected, the
number of industries affected, and the number of geographical areas
affected.I85 The geographical area factor suggests an antitrust relevant-
market definition. 86 If the proposed rule affects a substantial number
of small entities within a given area, the definition can be satisfied even
if this number represents a small percentage of the national total. In
other words, a rule with only regional impact should not be tested by a
national definition of "substantial." Presumably, the converse is also
true, and thus small entities should make a careful study of the geo-
graphical reach of any rule.
The relevant product market is also a useful concept. SBA Stan-
dard Industry Codes 87 provide accepted definitions of particular lines
of commerce that may be affected, thereby separating the market into
meaningful parts. The question of substantiality will relate to the
number of small businesses affected within that particular industry.
Once the relevant product market is established, one may easily calcu-
late the ratio of affected small entities over all small entities alone or
small and large entities combined.
The legislative history suggests that forty percent of the small enti-
ties in given geographical or product markets would certainly qualify
as a "substantial number."' 88 Whether smaller percentages also qual-
185. See OMB INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 184, at 6-7.
186. For a discussion of relevant market shares and anticompetitive effects, see 4 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 910a-910e (1980).
187. The SBA publishes a Standard Industrial Classification Manual which contains about
950 four-digit designations. See OFFICE OF STATISTICAL STANDARDS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS-
URY, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL (1967).
188. The 40% figure is derived from the House discussion, see text accompanying notes 177-78
.supra, which reasoned that if200 of 500 small organizations face a particular regulatory burden, it
is substantial. The House also listed an impact on 15 of 25 small businesses as substantial. 126
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ify is less clear, but according to the legislative history any formula
should be liberally interpreted to effectuate the coverage of the Act.8 9
The substantiality question in the abstract continues to be difficult to
answer; thus, the best advice to those seeking coverage is to prepare the
strongest statistical case for the highest percentage of small entities
affected. 19o
D. Formulating the Initial and Final Regulatory-Flexibility Analyses.
An important requirement of the RFA is that agencies proposing
rules must consider the impact of those rules on small entities. The
"principle of regulatory issuance" postulated by the RFA is that agen-
cies should "fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject
to regulation."' 91 To accomplish this regulatory "fit," the RFA re-
quires that every proposed rule subject to its jurisdiction be accompa-
nied by an initial regulatory-flexibility analysis (IRFA) and that every
final rule be accompanied by a final regulatory-flexibility analysis
(FRFA).192
Each of these documents has a format with a common-sense pur-
pose: to elicit the consideration, description, and explanation of the use
or nonuse of certain regulatory alternatives.19 3 The IRFA should sug-
gest regulatory alternatives such as differing compliance and reporting
requirements (in effect, "tiering"), simplification of those requirements,
use of performance rather than design standards, and exemptions from
the rule's coverage. 194 The FRFA must contain a succinct statement of
the need for the rule, a summary of comments on the regulatory-flex-
ibility alternatives, and a description and explanation for rejection of
CONG. REc. H8469 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980). Although over-reliance on these percentages is
tempting, 40% or more should clearly qualify as substantial by any definition.
189. In this context, the House discussion emphasizes that "the legislation is intended to be as
inclusive as possible, and doubts about its applicability should be resolved in favor of complying
with the provisions of the Act." 126 CONG. REc. H8468 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980).
190. Engaging in this kind of exercise is familiar to antitrust plaintiffs who try to define mar-
kets narrowly to maximize a particular firm's impact, and to antitrust defendants, who seek to
define markets broadly to minimize their respective firms' impact. See generally 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TUJrErt, supra note 186, § 507. In the RFA context, there is not likely to be a party with the
incentives of an antitrust defendant to contradict the proffered small entity definition.
191. Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 1164, reprinted/n 5
U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124 (Supp. IV 1980).
192. 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-604 (Supp. IV 1980). The IRFA may be waived or delayed in emergency
circumstances if the agency head so states (and provides reasons); the FRFA cannot be waived,
but it may be delayed for up to 180 days after the rule is promulgated on proper findings by the
agency head. Id § 608.
193. Id §§ 603-604.
194. Id § 603(c).
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each "significant" alternative that the agency considered.195 The
FRFA must either accompany the final rule or be made available to the
public on request.196 Despite these fairly detailed instructions, several
crucial questions of interpretation and application remain unanswered
or inadequately resolved. Among these queries are the effect of contra-
dictory substantive law on the regulatory-flexibility process, the actual
analytical techniques required to satisfy the regulatory-flexibility pro-
cess of analysis, and the relationship of the RFA to other regulatory-
analysis requirements.
1. The Effect of Contradictory Substantive Law. The RFA states
that it is not intended to contradict the requirements placed on agencies
by organic legislation. In fact, the introductory note to the RFA ad-
monishes agencies to engage in regulatory-flexibility analysis if such
analysis is "consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes." 197 Section 606 states that "the requirements of sections 603
and 604 of this title do not alter in any manner standards otherwise
applicable by law to agency action."198 Both sections 603 and 604 also
emphasize that such analysis shall be "consistent with the stated objec-
tives of applicable statutes."199
The legislative history deals with the question of statutory incon-
sistency in several ways. It is obvious that Congress did not want to use
the RFA as a means of overruling statutory requirements. 2°° The
RFA in all likelihood would not have become law if it amounted to an
implicit rejection of substantive legislative requirements, especially
195. Id § 604. Of course, one of the alternatives discussed in the IRFA may become the one
chosen in the final rule, apparently the ideal outcome under the RFA.
196. No mention is made of who should bear the costs of copying and distribution, which
means that the costs will presumably fall on the agency promulgating the rule unless it promul-
gates rules to the contrary.
197. See Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 1164, reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124 (Supp. IV 1980). This comment raises some interesting questions.
Concerning the requirement that an analysis not be inconsistent with the "objectives of any rule,"
it may be that the RFA will seek to change the "objectives" of a rule if those objectives unnecessa-
rily burden small entities; indeed, such change is the RFA's purpose. The probable meaning of
the term is that the RFA cannot change any rule's objectives if they are mandated by underlying
law. On the other hand, most regulatory "objectives" can be reconciled with the RFA by reading
the term to apply to those objectives.that can be met without inadvertently placing regulatory
burdens on small entities.
Section 606 speaks only of sections 603 and 604 not altering applicable agency standards.
This formulation presumably frees section 602 (the regulatory-agenda requirement) to suggest
alterations in those standards.
198. 5 U.S.C. § 606 (Supp. IV 1980).
199. Id §§ 603(c), 604(a).
200. Senator Culver's opening statement at the 1979 Regulatory Reform hearings noted "that
it is not the purpose of these hearings or of S. 299 to undermine worthwhile Federal regulatory
efforts." 1979 Senate AFA Hearings, supra note 133, pt.3, at 2.
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those in the health, safety, consumer, and environmental areas.20'
Thus, in such areas there was never a case made for giving small enti-
ties special treatment.
In some situations, however, it may be difficult to determine
whether a particular regulatory alternative will frustrate substantive
goals. For example, the use of exemptions from coverage, which is one
of the IRFA alternatives listed in subsection 603(c)(4), has the potential
to contradict underlying legislation. The legislative history recognizes,
however, that there may indeed be situations in which exemptions are
impermissible.20 2 That one or more alternatives are impermissible does
not necessarily mean that the regulatory-analysis process is unneces-
sary; rather, as long as some alternative (whether or not it is listed in
Section 603(c)) is feasible or permissible, the agency should follow the
IRFA process. Because it is difficult to believe that every alternative is
impermissible, an agency would be hard pressed ever to dispense with
the IRFA process.
The one exception to this generalization may occur in those agen-
cies such as OSHA, in which cost-benefit analysis is either forbidden or
clearly not required by Congress. The Supreme Court decided in
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan20 3 that Con-
gress does not require a cost-benefit analysis when it speaks of estab-
lishing "feasible" standards for dealing with toxic materials; 2°4
therefore, courts may not mandate that agencies perform such analyses.
This judicially sanctioned freedom from a cost-benefit analysis may ap-
pear to liberate agencies from the preparation of regulatory-flexibility
and other analyses, 205 but this conclusion can be reached only by
201. Senator Culver also stated, "It is not the aim of this legislation to allow the continuation
of practices which are dangerous to workers, consumers or the environment." Id.
202. The discussion of S. 299 makes the point as follows:
In some rare instances, the adoption of a flexible alternative may clearly be legally im-
permissible. If so, an agency may so indicate with a simple statement such as: "Under
Section X of the Y Act, the agency is required to promulgate these rules in a uniform
manner upon all members of the public;" or "Under the Supreme Court decision in X v.
Y, no exceptions to this rule can be permitted;" or "Differing standards of compliance
can be required only under circumstances described in Section A of the B Act, and those
circumstances do not occur in this situation."
126 CONG. REc. S10,937 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980). See also, 1979 Senate AF Hearings, supra note
133, pt.3, at 3-11 (testimony of Peter Petkas).
203. 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
204. The American Textile case dealt with a challenge to OSHA's cotton dust inhalation stan-
dard promulgated pursuant to the agency's objectives set out in 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
205. These other analyses include, in particular, Executive Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193,
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124 (Supp. IV 1980), which requires executive agencies to
determine that the potential benefits to society of a regulatory action outweigh its potential costs
before the agency takes action. See notes 231-35 infra and accompanying text. After theAmerl-
can Textile decision, executive agencies such as OSHA might not follow this requirement. If such
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resorting to an unduly narrow reading of the regulatory-flexibility re-
quirements. The RFA never mentions the term "cost-benefit" in
describing the kinds of alternatives it seeks to have agencies consider.
Moreover, it does not mandate any particular form of analysis or any
given outcome. Therefore, the regulatory-flexibility-analysis process
should be applicable even to those agencies such as OSHA that are
congressionally freed from the use of cost-benefit analysis. Indeed,
since OSHA itself has recently begun to employ concepts such as tier-
ing in its promulgation of standards,20 6 the implementation of the
RFA process should not be difficult. A sensible approach to the regula-
tory-flexibility-analysis process is for agencies uniformly to prepare an
IRFA listing all possible significant alternatives and then to use the
comment period to focus on objections to particular alternatives from
both legislative and feasibility viewpoints. These objections can be
articulated in the FRFA as reasons for rejection of a particular signifi-
cant alternative.
2. The Analytical Techniques Required or Encouraged by the
RFFA. Agencies must use "regulatory analysis" in preparing the IRFA
and FRFA, a term not self-explanatory. A variety of analytical tech-
niques are available, some more burdensome than others, that would
meet the RFA's analysis requirements. Regulatory analysis can be a
code word for regulatory paralysis and the drafters were sensitive to the
charge that the RFA itself would add another delaying mechanism to
the administrative process. 207 Congress placed responsibility for com-
agencies choose not to follow the mandate of Executive Order 12,291, the Court's decision protects
them; indeed, one can read the decision as forbidding cost-benefit analysis by OSHA, thus
preventing OSHA from complying with the Executive Order. In any event, the Executive Order's
cost-benefit requirements do not extend to independent agencies, unless the RFA were interpreted
to require cost-benefit analysis independent of the Executive Order (an interpretation that is not
recommended here, but that the OMB may encourage). See notes 228-42 infra and accompanying
text.
206. 1979 Senate AFFA Hearings, supra note 133, pt.3, at 189 (testimony of Eula Bingham:
"For small businesses OSHA provides special consideration"). See generally OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION'S IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESS (1976).
207. The legislative history divides the problem of administrative efficiency into two consider-
ations. The first objection concerns the costs to administrative efficiency of imposing yet another
analysis requirement upon agencies. The RFA's drafters pointed to the limitations in the RFA to
"a significant effect upon a substantial number of small entities," and noted that the goals of the
RFA "can be met largely through attentiveness by rulemakers to the unique problems of smaller
institutions." See 126 CONG. REc. S 10,938 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980). The point of this latter obser-
vation is that the Senate did not believe there was a real data collection or analysis problem, but
only a "lack of interest" by agencies that the RFA seeks to rectify.
The second objection based on administrative efficiency concerns the disruptive and dilatory
potential of judicial review, see notes 268-83 infra and accompanying text. See generally 1979
Senate JE4 Hearings, supra note 133, pt.3, at 5 (testimony of Peter Petkas).
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pliance oversight in the Office of Advocacy to emphasize small business
interests in government. The Office can be expected to demand much
of the regulatory-analysis process, but this arrangement creates inher-
ent tensions that will complicate the determination of acceptable ana-
lytical techniques.
Sections 603 and 604 of the RFA do not identify the analytical
techniques an agency should use in discussing suggested regulatory al-
ternatives, but section 607 provides an important guide: "In comply-
ing with the provisions of sections 603 and 604 of this title, an agency
may provide either a quantifiable or numerical description of the ef-
fects of a proposed rule or alternatives to the proposed rule, or more
general descriptive statements if quantification is not practicable or re-
liable. 20 8 This provision and the related legislative history indicate
that the agency is not to perform regulatory analyses that require exten-
sive creation of new data or even elaborate reworking of existing data.
Rather it appears that an agency is to rely on existing data, which may
or may not be quantified, and on whatever additional data it receives
during the comment process. 209 If the main problem the RFA seeks to
overcome is an agency "lack of interest" in small entities,210 then data
collection is simply not the thrust of the statute.
This narrow view of the agency's data collection role has impor-
tant budgetary consequences. The agency will not usually need to
commission staff or outside consultants to produce studies on small en-
tity impact, but should be able to incorporate the small entity impact
issue into related studies.21' This interpretation will surely please agen-
cies, but it may have the opposite effect on the Office of Advocacy,
which may envision more stringent regulatory-flexibility responsibili-
ties.212 Moreover, the OMB has circulated tentative regulatory-analy-
sis guides that must also be considered.213
If the Office of Advocacy behaves as if compliance with the re-
quirements of the RFA is the sole responsibility of agencies, it could
208. 5 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. IV 1980).
209. The Senate section-by-section analysis of the RFA stated that with respect to section 607,
"agencies are encouraged to make reasoned estimates or [sic] quantifiable and non-quantifiable
effects of various proposals, basing such estimates upon experience and expertise of agency per-
sonnel and any other information made available to the agency by external sources." 126 CONG.
Rac. S 10,942 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
210. See note 207 supra.
211. See note 209 supra. For a discussion of the question of relating the RFA process to other
regulatory analysis requirements, see text accompanying notes 224-54 infra.
212. The Office of Advocacy can be expected to make its view known through the formulation
of guidelines for the preparation of RFAs.
213. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, INTERIM REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS GUI-
DANCE (1981) [hereinafter cited as OMB GUIDELINES].
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well establish guidelines that are more onerous than necessary. The
temptation is undoubtedly present to postulate standards for creating
an "ideal" IRFA and suggesting that those standards should be the
norm.214 For example, proposing economic modelling of industries af-
fected by a rule subject to the RFA could result in costly studies by
agencies that would consume most of the agency resources available for
rulemaking generally.215 Such standards would ultimately prove
counterproductive 21 6 and confirm fears that the RFA will deal a sharp
blow to administrative efficiency. An institutional outline or guide to
the IRFA that accepts realistic limits on the requirements of agency
data collection and organization would best serve the long-run interests
of those supporting the RFA.
The OMB has not yet decided whether it intends to propose an
official outline.217 To date, the OMB approach has simply been to
provide an interim outline of the regulatory-impact analysis required
under Executive Order 12,291218 and to ask agencies to suggest im-
provements and ways in which the RFA requirements may be incorpo-
rated into the Executive Order.219 Thus, the OMB will probably push
the RFA process in the direction of the Executive Order regulatory-
impact analysis over which the OMB has jurisdiction. What difficul-
ties, if any, will emerge from this approach are not yet clear. One con-
cern is whether agency compliance will require a thorough cost-benefit
analysis, which does not seem to be called for under the RFA. This
approach could cause a problem if agencies are not required or even
permitted to conduct such analyses.2 0
214. Bureaucratic behavior that seeks to maximize the agency's own particular role is under-
standable but especially mischievous when one bureaucracy oversees another. In this case, the
RFA gives the Office of Advocacy a unique role in emphasizing compliance by rulemaking agen-
cies, a role that can easily be overemphasized.
215. It is possible that the SBA will have already collected some data on industry behavior
that would be of use to agencies making industry-specific evaluations through the SBA's codes.
However, agencies are also called upon to make impact studies of small organizations and small
governmental jurisdictions in situations in which there is no data base comparable to that avail-
able through the SBA.
216. Burdensome RFA performance standards would become counterproductive because they
would be likely to encourage agencies to opt out of the RFA through the certification process
rather than attempt compliance with the IRFA requirements. See text accompanying notes 170-71
supra.
217. OMB is still circulating a helpful but succinct outline of the IRFA prepared during the
closing days of the Carter administration. See OMB INTERiM GUIDANCE, supra note 184.
218. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, reprintedin 5 U.S.C app. § 601, at 124 (Supp. IV 1980).
219. Letter from James C. Miller III, Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs,
OMB, to agency heads (June 12, 1981). For a discussion of the interaction between the Executive
Order and the RFA, see notes 228-42 infra and accompanying text.
220. See notes 203-05 supra and accompanying text. The ultimate reach of cases like American
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), is not yet clear. The Court was not faced
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Some agencies have prepared their own RFA regulatory-flexibility
guidelines. The FDA, for example, published a useful guide for its reg-
ulation writers and developers when the RFA became effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1981.221 The guide discusses the RFA and related executive
orders and outlines various regulatory alternatives (such as tiering, ex-
emptions, and performance standards) that may be useful in preparing
regulatory-flexibility analyses. 222 The FDA guide does not discuss a
format for the preparation of an IRFA or FRFA, but it does recom-
mend a procedure for advance notice of proposed rulemaking. This al-
lows early collection of information about a proposed rule, including
how the rule will affect small business.3 3
At this stage, an agency can experiment with the preparation of
IRFAs and still be within the broad outlines of the RFA. It may be
that guidelines proposed by the Office of Advocacy or by the OMB will
ultimately limit agency experimentation, but there is little evidence that
Congress intended the IRFA to become an analytical straightjacket.
Section 603 is a clearly expressed provision and it should not pose diffi-
culties for agencies that have personnel with the appropriate analytical
skills. Discussion of the significant alternatives will require care and
creativity, but there are no unfamiliar concepts to consider. Experience
with the process, coupled with a good faith effort to comply, should
allow agencies to create satisfactory, if not ideal, regulatory-flexibility
analyses.
3. The RFA's Relationship to Executive Order 12,291 and to the
Paperwork Reduction Act. Section 605(a) of the RFA emphasizes the
avoidance of duplicative or unnecessary analyses: "Any Federal
agency may perform the analyses required by sections 602, 603, and
604 of this title in conjunction with or as a part of any other agenda or
analysis required by any other law if such other analysis satisfies the
with the question whether OSHA may voluntarily engage in cost-benefit analysis. Therefore,
OSHA, as an executive agency, may perform the cost-benefit analyses called for by Executive
Order 12,291. But a future litigant will in all likelihood call attention to the Court's language in
American Textile that in passing the RFA, Congress had already balanced the costs and benefits
and did not expect the agency to do so again. See id at 519-22. If this argument succeeds, the
Executive Orders requirements could not be imposed and the only regulatory analysis that could
operate would be that provided for under the RFA. The Director of OSHA, Thorne G. Auchter,
has already indicated that his agency will drop plans to apply cost-benefit analysis. N. Y. Times,
July 13, 1981, §A, at 11.
221. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
FLEXIBLE REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES: A GUIDE FOR FDA MANAGERS, REGULATION WRITERS
AND DEVELOPERS (1981).
222. Id. 3-6.
223. Id. 8.
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provisions of such sections. ' 224 Section 605(c) complements this ap-
proach by allowing agencies to combine related rules for purposes of
analysis: "In order to avoid duplicative action, an agency may consider
a series of closely related rules as one rule for the purposes of sections
602, 603, 604 and 610 of this title. ' 225 The obvious intent of these pro-
visions is to encourage administrative efficiency in the preparation of
regulatory analyses. There are numerous opportunities for integrating
regulatory-flexibility requirements into existing regulatory analyses.
Many agencies, as a matter of common sense, focus on regulatory alter-
natives during rulemaking; achieving the proper fit between the regula-
tion and the regulated (the RFA principle) is not a new idea. In other
situations, Congress specifically encourages agencies to undertake anal-
yses when small businesses are involved, and with only slight modifica-
tions this same analysis could satisfy the IRFA requirements. 226
Furthermore, the collection and organization of existing data may be
adequate to satisfy the RFA requirements. In addition to congression-
ally mandated analyses, the requirements imposed by Executive Order
12,291 and the Paperwork Reduction Act227 can also be integrated into
the RFA process.
(a) The R.FA and Executive Order 12,291. Executive Order
12,291, issued by President Reagan on February 17, 1981,228 is
designed to minimize duplication and conflict of regulations and to en-
sure well-reasoned regulations. Much like the RFA, the Executive Or-
der requires a regulatory-impact analysis that lists regulatory
alternatives, but it departs from the RFA in that it applies only to "ma-
jor rules"229 issued by executive agencies.230  Unlike the RFA, it em-
phasizes cost-benefit analysis233 t The Executive Order is more
emphatic than the RFA, instructing agencies not to promulgate rules
unless the potential benefits to society outweigh the potential costs. On
224. 5 U.S.C. § 605(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
225. Id § 605(c).
226. In FTC rulemaking, for example, the Commission is required to publish an advance
notice of rulemaking that discusses "possible regulatory alternatives." 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(2)(A)
(Supp. IV 1980). When the Commission promulgates a rule, the statement of basis and purpose
must contain "a statement as to the economic effect of the rule, taking into account the effect on
small business and consumers." Id § 57(a)(d)(1).
227. 44 U.S.C.A §§ 3501-3520 (West Supp. 1981).
228. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 601, at 124 (Supp. IV 1980).
229. Major rules are defined as those likely to result in "[a]n annual effect on the economy of
$100 million or more." Id. l(b)(1). In addition, the Director of the OMB is granted the authority
to prescribe further criteria for defining a major rule, id. § 3(b), and may actually designate a rule
as major. Id. §§ 3(b), 6(a)(1).
230. See id. § 1(d).
231. .d. §2.
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the other hand, the RFA permits any regulatory outcome so long as the
alternatives are rejected after reasoned consideration.
Frequently, regulatory-impact analysis and regulatory-flexibility
analysis will both be applicable to a proposed rule.23 2 The RFA and
the Executive Order contemplate such overlaps and urge that the anal-
yses be combined.233 In each case a two-stage analysis, including a
preliminary and final step, is contemplated.23 4 The cost-benefit ap-
proach of the Executive Order may also constitute a "significant alter-
native" for purposes of IRFA analysis unless that approach is
forbidden by organic legislation. 3 5
Complications arise when an agency must submit its preliminary
or initial analyses for review. Under the RFA, all IRFAs must be
transmitted to the Office of Advocacy, but that Office has no direct role
in the rulemaking process.23 6 Under the Executive Order, the prelimi-
nary and final regulatory impact analyses must be submitted to the Di-
rector of the OMB for review.3 7 The agency must then consult with
232. The definition of "rule" is broader under Executive Order 12,291 than it is under the
RFA. The Executive Order does not tie the definition directly to the APA and it covers interpreta-
tive rules that the RFA definition excludes. Compare id. § l(a) with 5 U.S.C. § 601(2) (Supp. IV.
1980). See notes 154-61 supra and accompanying text. Also, the Executive Order directs that a
final regulatory-impact analysis be prepared for those rules that are not emergency rules and for
which no notice of rulemaking has been published. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(c)(1), 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124 (Supp. IV 1980).
233. See. 5 U.S.C. § 605 (Supp. IV 1980); Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193
(1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124 (Supp. IV 1980).
234. These are called a preliminary and final regulatory impact analysis under the Order and
an IRFA and FRFA under the RFA.
235. See notes 197-202 supra and accompanying text. The Executive Order specifies that each
preliminary and final analysis contain the following information:
(1) A description of the potential benefits of the rule, including any beneficial effects
that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to
receive the benefits;
(2) A description of the potential costs of the rule, including any adverse effects that
cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to bear the
costs;
(3) A determination of the potential net benefits of the rule, including an evaluation
of effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms;
(4) A description of alternative approaches that could substantially achieve the same
regulatory goal at lower cost, together with an analysis of this potential benefit and costs
and a brief explanation of the legal reasons why such alternatives, if proposed, could not
be adopted; and
(5) Unless covered by the description required under paragraph (4) of this subsec-
tion, an explanation of any legal reasons why the rule cannot be based on the require-
ments set forth in Section 2 of this Order.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(d)(l)-(5), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,194 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app.,
at 124-25 (Supp. IV 1980).
236. See 5 U.S.C. § 603 (Supp. IV 1980). The FRFA need not be submitted to the Office of
Advocacy. See id. § 604.
237. To allow the Director to conduct this review, an agency must submit the preliminary
analysis sixty days before publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking and the final analysis
thirty days before promulgation of the final rule. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(c), 46 Fed. Reg.
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the Director and refrain from publishing its notice or promulgating its
final rule, as the case may be, during the consultation process.238 The
Executive Order stops short of forbidding publication or promulgation
if the consultation process is unsuccessful, but it obviously contem-
plates a much more direct coordination role for the OMB than does the
RFA for the Office of Advocacy. Assuming a rule is subject to both
analyses, there is no apparent way to avoid the OMB consultation pro-
cess for RFA rules unless legislation declares to the contrary, either
directly or by establishing time limits on rule promulgation. 239
The Executive Order process clearly dominates when rules are
subject both to regulatory analysis under the Executive Order and to
regulatory-flexibility requirements under the RFA. The RFA process
will operate freely only in those rulemaking circumstances in which the
Executive Order does not apply. These circumstances include all in-
dependent agency rulemaking and any executive agency rulemaking
that involves rules having an impact of less than $100 million on the
economy,240 a category into which a large number of rules will fall.241
The Office of Advocacy is well advised to consolidate its oversight re-
sources over these rules and leave the other rules to the OMB to review
under the Executive Order, unless there are strong pro-small-business
reasons for joining in the OMB's review process. 242
(b) The RIA and the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980,243 designed with small business specifically in
mind, establishes standards for the review and reduction of reporting
and paperwork requirements.244 It gives the OMB, through the newly
created Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), responsi-
13,194-95 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124-25 (Supp. IV 1980). Even if it is not
"major," each rule must be submitted to the Director at least ten days before publication and
promulgation, respectively. Id. § 3(c)(3).
238. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(f)(1) - (2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,195 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. § 601 app., at 125 (Supp. IV 1980).
239. The Executive Order states that it does not apply when its deadlines conflict with dead-
lines imposed by statute or judicial order. Id. § 8(2).
240. See id § l(b)(1).
241. Independent agencies such as the SEC, the FTC, the ICC and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission issue many regulations that concern small business. The $100 million thresh-
old for Executive Order regulations excludes from coverage executive agency regulations that
probably number in the thousands.
242. One can foresee the OMB's willingness to allow the Office of Advocacy to take the lead
concerning regulations that exceed $100 million if the regulations have a significant impact on
small business and if the OMB and the Office of Advocacy have a good working relationship.
243. 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3520 (West Supp. 1980).
244. The first purpose of the Act is "to minimize the Federal Paperwork burden for individu-
als, small businesses, State and local governments, and other persons." Id. § 3501(1) (emphasis
added). See also WITrE HousE COMM'N supra note 24, at 29 (calling for the elimination of
oneroud reporting requirements).
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bility for review of the information policies of independent and execu-
tive agencies and mandates a reduction in federal paperwork by
October, 1983.245
The Act imposes several duties on agencies and on the OMB with
regard to rulemaking. At the time the notice of a proposed rulemaking
is published, agencies must forward to the OIRA copies of all proposed
rules that require collection of information.246 Within sixty days after
receipt of these rules, the OIRA may file public comments on the rules'
information-collection requirements and the agency must respond to
these comments in its final rule. Within sixty days of the publication of
the final rule, the OMB (through the OIRA) may disapprove any col-
lection of information it deems unreasonable. 247
The OMB's control over agency rulemaking under the Paperwork
Reduction Act could affect rulemaking proceedings that are also sub-
ject to the RFA. The Office of Advocacy may have to coordinate its
regulatory-flexibility function with the OMB when the Paperwork Re-
duction Act applies.248 Undoubtedly there will be circumstances in
which the Office of Advocacy will respond to information-collection
regulations by recommending alternatives which exempt small entities
or reduce the collection burden such entities would otherwise bear. In
these circumstances, the Office of Advocacy has an ally in the OMB
and the Paperwork Reduction Act. However, there will be an inevita-
ble shift of agency attention away from the RFA under these circum-
stances because the OMB generally has a stronger influence on agency
behavior.249
One important purpose of the Paperwork Reduction Act is to serve
through the Federal Information Locater System as a collector of infor-
mation about reporting requirements. 250 This system, to be maintained
by the OIRA, is to collect and to index agency requests for data collec-
tion and is thus to facilitate the cooperative exchange of data among
agencies and the reduction of requests for new data.25' This capability
245. See 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3504, 3505 (West Supp. 1981).
246. Id. § 3504(h)(l)-(5).
247. Id § 3507(b). An independent agency may overrule OMB disapproval of its informa-
tion-collection request by a majority vote of its members. Id. at § 3507(c).
248. Because the Paperwork Reduction Act reaches independent agencies it may have a
greater overlap with the RFA than does Executive Order 12,291.
249. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, OMB reports to Congress about agencies which
violate the Act 44 U.S.C.A. § 3514(a)(7) (West Supp. 1980). This reporting function is similar to
the Office of Advocacy's annual report to the President and Congress under the RFA. See 5
U.S.C. § 612(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
250. See 44 U.S.C.A § 3511 (West Supp. 1980).
251. Before seeking information, agencies must check with OMB to determine if the data, or
substantially similar data, already exists in the system. See id. §§ 3508-3510.
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should be of use to the Office of Advocacy in its monitoring of agency
rulemaking because one of the purposes of IRFA is to identify duplica-
tive federal rules and reporting requirements. 252 In effect, the OIRA
will collect useful information that will assist both the Office of Advo-
cacy and the agencies themselves in complying with the RFA
requirements.
The interaction of the RFA, the Paperwork Reduction Act, and
Executive Order 12,291 may sound harmonious in theory, but there is
real potential for delay and confusion in practice. Agencies may find
themselves with three new directives to consider before publishing pro-
posed rules for comment, 253 a situation that would considerably delay
the rulemaking process (perhaps this is one of the unarticulated pur-
poses of regulatory analysis) 254 and that would require agencies to de-
velop special expertise in juggling the various new demands on the
rulemaking process.
E. Reviewing Existing Rules and Establishing Agendas.
The RFA imposes two further responsibilities on agencies that
promulgate rules. Under section 602 an agency must establish regula-
tory-flexibility agendas, to be published semiannually in the Federal
Register,255 and under section 610 it must publish and implement a
plan for reviewing the impact of existing rules on small entities. The
rules covered are those likely to have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities. Each rule must be summarized
and given a timetable according to which action on the rule will be
completed.256 The agenda goes to the Office of Advocacy for comment
and is available for review by small entities or their representatives.
The purpose of the agenda is to provide small entities with another
kind of early warning system.257 It does not, however, bind an agency
252. See 5 U.S.C. § 603(b)(4)-(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
253. The Appendix contains a chart showing how the requirements of the RFA, the Executive
Order, and the Paperwork Reduction Act interact.
254. On the advisability of "slowing the regulatory process to a crawl" as a means of deregula-
tion, see Eads, supra note 60, at 26.
255. 5 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. IV 1980). The RFA does not specify any particular dates within
these months because of the need to coordinate publication submission dates with the Office of the
FederalRegister. See OMB INTERIM GuIDANcE, supra note 184. For a good example of a regula-
tory agenda incorporating section 602 requirements with those of other regulatory agendas, see 46
Fed. Reg. 53,990 (1981) (EPA Regulatory Agenda).
256. 5 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. IV 1980). This timetable applies only to those rules that have
been subject to a notice of proposed rulemaking. The Senate analysis makes clear that the agenda
does not force agencies to announce rulemaking proceedings that are still in the planning stage.
126 CONG. REc. S10,941 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
257. See 126 CONG. Rc. S10,941 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
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to make future determinations in accordance with its terms. 258
Executive Order 12,291 also requires the publication of a regula-
tory agenda, which may be incorporated into the RFA section 602
agenda.259 The substantive requirements of the Executive Order
agenda are phrased in language similar to that of the RFA, except that
the former is directed at major rules rather than at rules having a sig-
nificant economic impact.260 The intent of the Executive Order is to
avoid duplication by coordinating its requirements as neatly as possible
with those of the RFA. The Executive Order does, however, add the
requirement that existing regulations be reviewed in its agenda, a sub-
ject the RFA treats separately.261
The RFA's plan for reviewing existing rules is a basic part of its
goal of reducing the burden of regulation on small entities. The plan
works on the sensible assumption that much burdensome regulation is
already in effect and it seeks to have agencies systematically review
such regulations under an established schedule. The agency must pub-
lish the review plan within 180 days after the effective date of the RFA
- July 1, 1981 - and the plan must provide for a review every ten
years.262 Review of existing rules imposes an enormous administrative
burden on the responsible agency, for the agency must first review all
of its rules to determine whether the rules have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities, a complex determina-
tion in itself. Then the agency must assess the following:
(1) the continued need for the rule;
(2) the nature of complaints or comments received concerning
the rule from the public;
(3) the complexity of the rule;
(4) the extent to which the rule overlaps, duplicates or conflicts
with other Federal rules, and, to the extent feasible, with State and
local governmental rules; and
(5) the length of time since the rule has been evaluated or the
degree to which technology, economic conditions, or other factors
have changed in the area affected by the rule.263
These factors, similar to those listed in an earlier Executive Order
258. See 5 U.S.C. § 602(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
259. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 5(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app., at 125 (Supp. IV 1980).
260. See notes 229-30 supra and accompanying text. The similar phraseology suggests the
drafters of the Executive Order borrowed their language from the RFA.
261. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 5(a)(3), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app., at 125 (Supp. IV 1980).
262. This period can be expanded annually, on notice, for an additional five years. 5 U.S.C.
§ 610(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
263. Ad § 610(b)(1)-(5).
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issued by President Carter,264 are described in the legislative history of
the RFA as non-burdensome because of their familiarity.265 Obvi-
ously, however, this review process will require a great deal of agency
effort, which implies that the real purpose of this burden is to keep an
agency from doing anything but reviewing rules.2
66
Despite its list of factors, the RFA does not aid agencies in setting
priorities for reviewing rules. Given the burden on an agency to con-
duct the review in the first place, it is important to establish some
method whereby the rules most burdensome on small entities are con-
sidered first. One approach is to use the factors themselves to establish
priorities. 267 For example, the complaints received about a rule may
indicate what burdens that rule imposes. An agency can refine com-
plaint data, analyzing the complaint by type and characteristics, and
develop a coefficient of regulatory burden for each of its existing rules.
An agency that sets review priorities based on an analysis of complaints
may be operating more efficiently than other agencies even if it reviews
fewer existing regulations.
F. The Role of Judicial Review.
The RFA contains an extremely qualified and ambiguous provi-
sion for judicial review; yet, much of the RFA's enforcement potential
depends on the interpretation of this provision. Section 611 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), any determi-
nation by an agency concerning the applicability of any of the provi-
sions of this chapter to any action of the agency shall not be subject
to judicial review.
(b) Any regulatory flexibility analysis prepared under sections
603 and 604 of this title and the compliance or noncompliance of the
agency with the provisions of this chapter shall not be subject to judi-
cial review. When an action for judicial review of a rule is instituted,
any regulatory flexibility analysis for such rule shall constitute part
of the whole record of agency action in connection with the review.
(c) Nothing in this section bars judicial review of any other im-
pact statement or similar analysis required by any other law if judi-
264. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 671 (1978), revokedby Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124 (Supp. IV 1980).
265. See 126 CONG. REc. S10,942 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
266. Consider the requirement that a rule be reviewed to determine conflict or overlap with
federal, state, and local rules. There are few existing guides to detect current conflicts between
federal regulations (indeed the Code of Federal Regulation still lacks a comprehensive index) and
no guides helpful for comparing state and local rules, which are not even published in many cases.
267. Executive Order 12,044 also adds some useful criteria for setting review priorities, such as
burdens imposed by the rule and the need for clarifying language. See 3 C.F.R. 674 (1978),
revokedby Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124
(Supp. IV 1980).
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cial review of such statement or analysis is otherwise provided by
law.2
6 8
On its face, this provision seems more like a statement of non-review-
ability than of reviewability, but by including the IRFA and the FRFA
as part of the whole record it obviously contemplates some manner of
judicial review of the RFA process. The purpose of this provision can
be best understood by an examination of the relevant legislative
history.
1. Legislative Background Section 611(a) is a clear non-review-
ability provision for actions under the RFA other than the regulatory-
flexibility analyses of sections 603 and 604. Thus, the following are
beyond judicial scrutiny: an agency decision under section 605(b) to
certify a rule as not having a significant economic impact on a substan-
tial number of small entities; agency actions under sections 602 and 610
concerning the regulatory agenda or periodic review of existing rules;
or any procedural decisions under sections 608 and 609.269 This is the
clear import of section 611(a) and the relevant legislative reports. 270 In
effect, Congress subordinated the value of compliance induced by judi-
cial oversight to the values of administrative efficiency and uninter-
rupted decisionmaking. 271 Even though the non-reviewability of the
certification process may frustrate the RFA's purpose, Congress chose
to take this risk rather than embroil the process in the quagmire of
litigation.272
268. 5 U.S.C. § 611 (Supp. IV 1980).
269. In emergency circumstances, § 608 provides for waiver of an IRFA and for delay of a
FRFA for up to 180 days. The rule concerns lapses if the FRFA is not completed by then, but
§ 611(a) apparently bars judicial enforcement of this "lapse." Section 609 establishes procedures
for gathering comments from small entities.
270. The Senate section-by-section analysis of S. 299 states:
Section 611(a) provides that there is no judicial review of any determination by an
agency regarding the applicability of any provision of this subchapter except as provided
in Section 611(b). This means, for example, that the decision by an agency with respect
to what proposed rules would have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities pursuant to Section 605(b) shall not be subject to judicial re-
view. Thus, the decision regarding when the agency shall conduct a regulatory flexibility
analysis remains in the sole discretion of the agency. Also not subject to judicial review
are agency determinations regarding the agenda (section 602), the procedures for gather-
ing comments (section 609), the periodic review of rules (section 610) and any other
administrative determinations under this act.
126 CONG. REc. S10,942-43 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
271. In the Senate discussion, the judicial review (or non-review) provision is addressed as a
solution to the perceived problem of "increased litigation" and "undue delay." See Id. S 10,937.
272. In one respect the certification process does hint at some judicial oversight. If an agency
improperly uses the certification process (as determined by the Office of Advocacy) and later
promulgates a rule, one can argue that the rule will lapse in 180 days for failure to supply a
FRFA, per § 608(b). There is a question, however, who can raise this "lapse" and in what forum.
Judicial review seems inappropriate because of § 611(a). Apparently, Congress did not envision
judicial review as the method to police improper certifications or improper emergency determina-
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Section 611(c) simply declares the obvious: nothing stated about
judicial review in the RFA is intended to affect review of any impact
statement mandated by other law.273 This provision is not discussed in
any detail in the legislative reports, but Congress apparently perceived
the possibility that combining regulatory-flexibility analyses with other
analyses (such as the regulatory-impact analysis required by Executive
Order 12,291) might unintentionally lead to a change in the standards
of judicial review.274 Because the subsection is only a cautionary one,
however, it has no real bearing on the question of the role of the courts
under the RFA. The subsection that raises that question is 611(b).
Section 611 emerged late in the legislative process. Senate bill S.
299 contained no specific judicial-review provision when it was intro-
duced into the Senate in the Ninety-sixth Congress and reported out of
the Judiciary Committee on May 5, 1980.275 That version had grafted
the substantive provisions of the RFA into the APA, primarily section
553 of the APA. As a result of failing to mention judicial review at this
point, the Senate recognized that the judicial-review provisions of the
APA would apply to review under the RFA amendments: "The bill
does nothing to alter the right of review of agency action as outlined in
5 U.S.C. § 702."276 When the bill went to the Senate floor for passage,
however, the RFA was recodified as a separate section of the APA,
acquiring section 611.
The Senate believed it was achieving a balance between the non-
reviewability provisions of related legislation277 and the full reviewabil-
ity of the APA by adding section 611:
tions. See note 269 supra. In effect, the policing mechanism is the Office of Advocacy's annual
reports to the President and to Congress.
273. See 5 U.S.C. § 611(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
274. President Carter's Executive Order 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 671 (1978), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), ieprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124 (Supp. IV 1980),
contained an explicit provision barring judicial review of its regulatory analyses. President Rea-
gan's Executive Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 app., at 124
(Supp. IV 1980), contains a judicial review provision that is equally as ambiguous as that in
§ 61 l(b) of the RFA:
This Order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Federal
government, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers or any
person. The determinations made by agencies under Section 4 of this Order, and any
Regulatory Impact Analyses for any rule, shall be made part of the whole record of
agency action in connection with the rule.
Id § 9. Because this provision is similar to § 611, any judicial interpretations it receives will bear
upon § 611.
275. See S. 299, supra note 83.
276. S. REP. No. 878, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980) accompanying S. 299.
277. See S. 262, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 607, 125 CONG. R c. S861 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979); S.
755, § 603 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 603, 125 CONo. REc. S3338 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1979) (the Senate
and Carter Administration omnibus regulatory-reform bills).
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[T]he bill strikes a balance between two central aims with regard to
the role of the courts. The first is to insure that an agency's compli-
ance with the objectives of this bill be subject to meaningful, yet
responsibly defined, judicial oversight. A flat prohibition of any such
oversight might give the erroneous impression that regulatory flex-
ibility provisions may be ignored with impunity ....
On the other hand, the bill avoids the substantial disruption of
agency rulemaking inherent in allowing separate judicial review of
the regulatory flexibility analysis itself .... 278
This balance was partially the result of the Senate's belief that to try to
prevent a reviewing court from examining the regulatory-flexibility
analysis would be "unrealistic." 279  The most satisfactory compromise,
therefore, was to permit a court to consider the final regulatory-flex-
ibility analysis as part of the whole rulemaking record, yet not to allow
the FRFA to be the separate subject of judicial review. This compro-
mise is ambiguous, however. Forbidding "separate judicial review"
can be read to mean forbidding not only interlocutory review but also
"separate" review of the FRFA as part of the evaluation of the under-
lying rule.
2. Problems of Interpretation. Apparently the FRFA exists for
the court to read, but not to evaluate, a difficult distinction for any
reviewing tribunal to draw. If the FRFA is so poor as to be worthless,
or is prepared manifestly in bad faith, is a reviewing court to ignore
challenges to the FRFA's validity when they are pressed by the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy? In those circumstances many judges would be
tempted to conclude that they are empowered to hold the FRFA as
well as the resulting rule arbitrary and capricious. But if the court is not
reviewing the FRFA in the first place, then any weakness in the FRFA
should be irrelevant to the decision whether to uphold or overturn the
rule to which the FRFA relates.280 Under this view, the FRFA will be
278. 126 CONG. REC. S10,939 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
279. Id. The Senate may have been mindful of the earlier testimony of the late Judge Harold
Leventhal (in connection with S. 262 and S. 755) on the court's role in considering "non-review-
able" analyses, as of the Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7617 (Supp. III 1979), to which
Judge Leventhal referred. Judge Leventhal took the position that the reviewing court should con-
sider any documents or analyses in the record that help it determine whether the rule itself is a
valid exercise of administrative power. See 1979 Senate RFA Hearings, supra note 133, pt. 1, at 6-
23.
280. In an exchange with Judge Leventhal during the hearings on the RFA, Senator Culver
asked the following question: "If an agency, for example, stated that it relied on an impact analy-
sis and the analysis was, in the judgment of the court, viewed to be arbitrary or capricious, could
the rule itself then not be considered to be arbitrary and capricious?" The Judge replied as fol-
lows: "I think that the function of the regulatory analysis in that case would only be to indicate
what the agency meant in its rule and what the agency was doing in its rule." 1979 Senate RFA
Hearings, supra note 133, pt. 1, at 14.
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of assistance to the court in determining the meaning of the rule, but it
should not itself lead to an overturning of the rule.281
The legislative history does not fully endorse this narrow view of
the role of judicial review. Both the Senate and the House discussions
indicate that failure to complete a FRFA, or preparing it inadequately
or in bad faith "would be grounds for finding the rule unreasonable
under established case law."'28 2 This interpretation conflicts with the
idea that the regulatory analysis is to be used only as a supplement to
the record, not as the subject of independent judicial review. Further-
more, the court is in a conceptual bind in determining whether the
agency performed the FRFA inadequately or in bad faith. The stan-
dards for judging regulatory analyses are hardly well established and
the regulatory-analysis process itself is experimental.
Thus, the legislative history raises the twin possibilities that section
611(b) may serve either as an independent ground for reviewing the
adequacy of the FRFA or only as an additional basis for review of the
underlying rule. It may not be necessary in the usual case, however, to
determine which possibility is correct, for in many situations poor per-
formance in the preparation of a FRFA will carry over to inadequate
preparation of the rule itself. Moreover, poor performance on the
281. This seems to be the view Judge Leventhal expressed. See notes 279-80 supra. On the
other hand, a sloppy or manifestly inadequate FRFA may indicate to the court that the rule itself
has not been adequately prepared. Judge McGowan has suggested that the presence of a regula-
tory analysis in the record may affect the court's judgment about the rule's validity, either posi-
tively or negatively, depending on the quality of the analysis. See Address by C. McGowan,
American Ass'n of Law Schools Conference (Jan. 4, 1981).
282. The Senate section-by-section analysis containing that conclusion reads as follows:
For example, in the unlikely event that following an agency head's decision not to certify
that a particular rule will have no significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities (pursuant to Section 605(b)), the agency then completely ignores the
resulting requirement to perform regulatory flexibility analyses, an injuredparty would
have grounds to argue that this fact is evidence of the unreasonableness of the rule.
Similarly if it can be demonstrated that a regulatory flexibility analysis has not been
prepared in good faith and the agency therefore is unable to provide substantive grounds
supporting the final rule in the statement of basis and purpose, the court would have
grounds to invalidate the rule. In addition, if an agency completely fails to respond to a
clearly available significant alternative to the rule less burdensome on small entities and
raised in public comments, then this failure would be grounds for finding the rule unrea-
sonable under established case law. See Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 417 U. S. 921 (1978); andAutomotive Parts andAccessories
v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462
F.2d 846, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
126 CONG. REC. S10,939 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1980).
In the House the following exchange on judicial review under S. 299 took place:
MR. BROOMFIELD. But what if the agency fails to do this analysis, or if the analysis
is inadequate, sloppy or incomplete?
MR. McDADE. Let me say unequivocally as a member of the committee that wrote this
bill, that in that instance, upon review of the final regulation, it is the intent of our
committee that the court should strike down the regulation.
126 CONG. REc. H8463 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980). Mr. McDade was a member of the committee
that drafted H.R. 4660, not S. 299.
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FRFA will undoubtedly color the court's view of the rule in question.
Should poor (or pro-forma) FRFA performance, however, not be re-
flected in the preparation of the underlying rule,283 the courts should
then rely on the underlying policies of the RFA to determine the ap-
propriate scope of judicial review. Ardent supporters of the RFA will
prefer broader, more liberal judicial review, which by its nature will
improve chances of agency compliance with the RFA's analysis re-
quirements. The RFA, however, is not designed to trigger judicial in-
tervention in the usual sense, for it does not adopt the APA judicial
review provisions. The most that can be said is that in designing the
judicial review provisions of the RFA, some members of Congress be-
lieved that in egregious cases of noncompliance the courts should inter-
vene on review of the underlying rule. That belief may convince a
reviewing court occasionally to assert itself in the RFA compliance
process.
G. The Role of the Office of Advocacy.
The ultimate success of the RFA rests on the shoulders of the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy. Section 612 requires the Chief Counsel
to monitor agency compliance with the RFA and to submit compliance
reports at least annually to the President and to Congress. 284 This sec-
tion also grants the Chief Counsel the right to intervene in any
rulemaking review proceeding to present his views on the effect of the
proposed rule on small entities, and requires agencies to report many of
their activities to the Chief Counsel. Because the RFA does not rely on
judicial enforcement by private parties, the Chief Counsel is in effect
the sole policeman. It is a complex role with many pitfalls, most of
which can be avoided by a person with keen political instincts.
1. The Chief Counsels Monitoring Role. Under the RFA the
Chief Counsel receives the regulatory-flexibility agendas, 285 initial reg-
ulatory-flexibility analyses, 286 and certifications declaring the inappli-
cability of the RFA. 287 Because these reports will inundate the Office
of Advocacy, the Chief Counsel must effectively monitor them to im-
283. See note 282 supra. It is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which the FRFA was
poorly done because the agency believed the small business concerns to be of marginal relevance
to the underlying rule and not worth the effort at compliance which the Office of Advocacy might
expect. At the same time the rule itself could be the product of careful analyses. Of course in this
situation, the agency might be better advised to certify out of the RFA under § 605(b) rather than
run the risk of jeopardizing the support of the rule on appeal through a poorly prepared FRFA.
284. 5 U.S.C. § 612 (Supp. IV 1980).
285. See id § 602.
286. See id § 603(a).
287. See id § 603(b).
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plement the goals of the RFA. Furthermore, because neither the agen-
das, the IRFA's, nor the certifications are subject to judicial review, the
Chief Counsel creates the only incentives for compliance.
Because many governmental agencies are unfamiliar with the Of-
fice of Advocacy, its first step is to gain the attention of the affected
agencies and then to turn that awareness into a credible force for com-
pliance. Only an effective Chief Counsel and a dedicated staff, using
all available persuasive tools, can produce the incentives for compli-
ance. For example, periodic reports to the President and to Congress
regarding the cooperation of individual agencies can form "winners
and sinners" lists that may be influential in determining reappoint-
ments and budgets. Also, the Chief Counsel's willingness to intervene
in rulemaking appeals from recalcitrant agencies should give the courts
an awareness of particular problem areas.
2. The Personnel Needs of the Office of Advocacy. The most dif-
ficult problem for the Chief Counsel will be to assemble a staff large
enough to undertake the monitoring process. When it passed the RFA,
Congress estimated approximately five hundred rules a year would re-
quire regulatory-flexibility analysis.28 8 That estimate appears to under-
state the actual workload, for even with the restraints on rulemaking
imposed by the Reagan administration,28 9 in the first seven months of
the RFA's existence 290 the Office of Advocacy has noted about one
thousand rules, for which the Office received about twenty IRFA's and
approximately eight hundred certifications. In the period of July 1,
1981 to October 1, 1981, 412 out of the 489 RFA dispositions were cer-
tifications.291  This apparent imbalance between certifications and
IRFA's is a matter of concern, because as a practical matter the Office
of Advocacy must concentrate on certifications as much as it does on
IRFA's.
At present the Office has about twenty-five attorneys assigned to
it292 as well as approximately eight trained economists. The RFA does
not increase this level of professional staffing, and given the current
general cutback in federal manpower, it is unlikely that additional sup-
port will be forthcoming. As presently organized, the Office has non-
professional intake personnel assigned to each agency or group of
288. 126 CONG. Rc. H8469 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1980).
289. President Reagan froze the issuance of new regulations by executive agencies for the first
three months of his term. Presidential Memorandum of January 29, 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,227
(1981). Since then, the number of new regulations issued has dropped significantly. See Statment
of Frank S. Swaim, supra note 171, at 57-59.
290. January 1, 1981 to July 31, 1981.
291. See note 283 su.pra.
292. See 15 U.S.C. § 634b-634d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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agencies that promulgates rules. These personnel collect certifications
and IRFA's and scan the FederalRegister for notices of proposed rules
that may require agency action under the RFA.293 But the review pro-
cess requires professionals, especially with respect to the review of cer-
tifications. 294 Because the Office of Advocacy estimates that about
seventy agencies promulgate rules that are potentially subject to the
RFA, the Office with its limited staff should develop a priority list of
the agencies that are of greatest concern to small entities and commit
staff resources to their monitoring. As a practical matter, it may be
necessary that the rules of some agencies go unreviewed if the Office is
to do its job at all.
To assist the Office in its monitoring function, volunteers from the
private sector can also be used to alert the staff to important rules.295
Furthermore, the Office can turn for assistance in regulatory analyses
to other government agencies, particularly to the OMB. But that alli-
ance, although critical to resolving the staffing problems facing the Of-
fice of Advocacy, will require careful attention.
3. The Office of Advocacy and the OMB. The overlap in juris-
diction between the OMB, which monitors the Paperwork Reduction
Act and Executive Order 12,291,296 and the Chief Counsel may create
disputes and confusion, but it can also serve as a source of mutual sup-
port. The OMB, through its Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs, is an established organization well trained to conduct regulatory
analysis. It has historically asserted strong control over the agencies
within its jurisdiction and certainly can be expected to assert itself in
any working relationship involving Executive Order 12,291 and the
293. The Office of Advocacy has drafted internal guides for RFA monitoring to assist its staff.
See OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, GUIDES TO REGULATORY FLEXI-
mLITY ANALYSIS MONITORING (Draft 1981) (on file with Duke Law Library).
294. The Chief Counsel for Advocacy has established a rule-review process with five compo-
nents: monitoring the Federal Register; logging of rules potentially subject to the RFA; review of
these rules by a professional staff member assigned to the particular agency; follow-up, fs needed,
and weekly assessment sessions by the Regulatory Flexibility Review Group. The Office is con-
sistently exploring use of computer software that would be compatible with the OMB Reports
Management System. See Statement of Frank S. Swaim, supra note 171, at 14-15.
295. The Office of Advocacy has already appointed a task force of volunteers to assist in the
monitoring process. So far over 200 unpaid monitors, many of whom are attorneys who practice
before the particular agencies involved, have been selected. Their role is primarily to serve as an
early-warning system and as a source of substantive guidance for the Office of Advocacy profes-
sionals who are assigned to specific agencies. In addition, many agencies have established RFA
officials as contact and resource persons. See GUIDES TO REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS
MONITORING, supra note 293, at 26-80 (on file with Duke Law Library).
296. See text accompanying notes 237-38 and 245.49 supra.
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RFA.2 97 The question is to what extent the Chief Counsel may rely on
OMB assistance in performing the monitoring role under the RFA
without yielding the decisional authority of the Office of Advocacy.
Obviously coordination is necessary, for otherwise the basic message of
regulatory reform sent by the last two administrations and by the RFA
itself would be ignored. On the other hand, coordination tends to cre-
ate bureaucratic rivalries. For example, the small business community,
whose chosen representative is the Chief Counsel, may well have spe-
cial interests that the OMB does not consider important. Moreover,
because Congress has clearly placed responsibility for small entities in
the hands of the Office of Advocacy, the Office is unlikely to tolerate
excessive OMB control. Because Congress and the President clearly
want to minimize the burden of regulatory analysis, the Office of Advo-
cacy and the OMB must minimize any disagreements and work to-
gether. Recognizing that the OMB has the quantitative expertise to
monitor agencies effectively, the Chief Counsel should rely on the
OMB for spedial skils.2 98
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF THE RFA TO THE REGULATORY REFORM
MOVEMENT
The RFA is part of a broad movement toward regulatory analysis
as a method of improving the performance of federal agencies. The
RFA is the first such experiment to become law; two omnibus bills
which failed to pass in the Ninety-sixth Congress included regulatory
analysis as centerpieces. 2 99 Because a strong impetus for regulatory
analysis is in both the House and the Senate of the Ninety-seventh
Congress, new legislation likely will be forthcoming and, if it is, the
RFA and its regulatory-flexibility requirements will become a key part
of the larger pattern of regulatory reform.
A. The Regulatory Reform Proposals.
Senator Laxalt has introduced a bill (S. 1,080) to amend the APA
by imposing regulatory analysis and review on all agencies that make
297. To some extent this integration has already occurred: the Executive Order ties directly
into the RFA requirements. See notes 228-42 supra and accompanying text.
298. Of course, the OMB has personnel limitations as well. The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs has a staff of some 90 professionals, after gaining many of the former employ-
ees of the Council on Wage and Price Stability. See Eads, supra note 60, at 22-23. Because the
OIRA has responsibility for the Paperwork Reduction Act and Executive Order 12,291, it is
doubtful that it will have the capacity to do much RFA work unless that work relates to its regula-
tory analysis under the Executive Order.
299. See S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S7128 (daily ed. June 6, 1979); S. 755,
supra note 277.
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rules.3°° Representative Danielson introduced a related bill (H.R. 746)
in the House.301 Both bills provide for regulatory analysis of new rules,
periodic review of existing rules, and publication of a regulatory
agenda. In these respects they track similar requirements under the
RFA. In other respects, however, they differ from the RFA.3 0 2
The bills impose standards of regulatory analysis that are more
reminiscent of Executive Order 12,291 than of the RFA. For example,
both bills deal with "major rules," measured in terms of impact.30 3 Fur-
thermore, the type of analysis required is more of the technical cost-
benefit type than the general regulatory-flexibility type. The Senate bill
requires that the statement of basis and purpose for a major rule in-
clude a "reasonable determination" that the benefits of the rule justify
the cost and adverse effects of the rule.3 4 This amounts to a require-
ment that cost-benefit analysis determine the outcome of agency
rulemaking, except when enabling legislation explicitly dictates to the
contrary.305 The House bill also requires preliminary and final regula-
tory analyses to be filed with each new rule, although it does not man-
date strict compliance with cost-benefit methods.30 6 Both bills allow
agencies to incorporate regulatory analyses from other statutes.30
7
The bills provide for agency review of existing major rules over a
ten-year period (which can be extended to fifteen if necessary).30 8 Each
300. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S4231 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1981). The bill
had 74 Senate co-sponsors. S. 1080 was passed by the Senate, with amendments, on March 24,
1982, by a vote of 94 to zero. 128 CONG. REc. 52713 (daily ed. March 24, 1982).
301. H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H73 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1981).
302. The two bills also differ significantly from each other but these differences are not dis-
cussed unless they relate to the RFA.
303. See S. 1080, supra note 300, at § 2(16); H.R. 746, supra note 301, at § 621(3). The bills
also include under the "major category," rules that have a significant adverse effect on health,
safety or the environment and rules that the President designates as major. The House bill adds to
regulatory analysis a category of "significant rules" that the agencies are to define according to the
number of entities covered, the compliance and reporting requirements involved, the direct and
indirect effects of the rule, and the rule's relationship to other rules. H.R. 746, supra note 301, at
§ 621(4).
304. See S. 1080, supra note 300, at § 3(e)(2).
305. S. 1080 allows for legislation, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified in various sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, and 49 U.S.C.),
which forbids cost-benefit analysis. See text accompanying notes 205-06 supra.
306. See H.R. 746, supra note 301, at § 622. The analysis originally required "an explanation
of why an approach entailing greater adverse economic effects was selected," id. § 602(c)(5)(B),
which did not, unlike the Senate bill, forbid non-cost justified outcomes. In the later revision of
the House bill, cost justification of a proposed rule is more clearly demanded. Id. § 622(c)(5)(B)
(amendment passed July 30, 1981).
307. S. 1080, supra note 300, at § 3(f)(4); H.R. 746, supra note 301, at § 622(d)(1). These bills
do not directly mention the RFA but their drafters probably contemplated the RFA's requirement
of regulatory-flexibility analysis.
308. See S. 1080, supra note 300, at § 560; H.R. 746, supra note 301, at § 641.
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bill also requires the establishment of regulatory agendas. Whereas the
Senate bill requires an agency to publish in the Federal Register an
agenda for all proposed rules and requires the "President or his desig-
nee" to publish a biannual list of major rules,309 the House bill requires
agencies themselves to publish a regulatory agenda of major rules in
the Federal Register on a biannual basis.310
Oversight responsibility for regulatory analysis also appears in the
proposed bills. The Senate bill assumes that the justification for a ma-
jor rule will be reviewed in its statement of basis and purpose as part of
the rule. It places in the President "or an officer designated by him" the
responsibility for reviewing existing rules and establishing the regula-
tory agenda.311 The House bill, which gives oversight responsibility
over the final regulatory analysis to the OMB and to the courts,312
places overall responsibility in the Comptroller General of the United
States to audit and to examine agency compliance with the regulatory-
analysis process and to make periodic reports to Congress.313
B. The AFA and Regulatory Reform.
On the solid assumption that some variation of the Senate and
House bills will become law, a need to relate that legislation to the
RFA and vice versa will arise, for recent congressional activity indi-
cates no effort will be made to eliminate or to reduce drastically the
role of the RFA in regulatory review. Because new legislation will
largely implement the regulatory-analysis requirements currently im-
posed by Executive Order 12,291, much of the reconciliation process
that now must take place between the Executive Order and the RFA
would be relevant to new legislation.314 To the extent that the Office of
Advocacy will already be familiar with the regulatory-flexibility pro-
cess, the Chief Counsel should be able to protect the working of the
RFA in any reconciliation between the RFA and new regulatory-re-
form legislation.
309. S. 1080, supra note 300, at § 561. The publication of major rules by the President is a
function similar to that which President Carter's Regulatory Council performed.
310. H.R. 746, supra note 301, at § 631. In addition, the bill instructs the President to publish
a Calendar of Federal Regulations, which presents information on major rules from all agencies.
Id. § 632.
311. S. 1080, supra note 300, at § 560(a)(2).
312. H.R. 746, supra note 301, at §§ 622(d)(3), 623. Section 624 of the bill provides:
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall monitor and review compli-
ance by agencies with the requirements of this subchapter and shall establish such proce-
dures as may be necessary to ensure such compliance. The Director shall from tune to
time report to the President and the Congress on such agency compliance.
313. Id § 625.
314. See notes 228-42 supra and accompanying text.
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There are several ways, however, in which new legislation could
reduce the importance of the RFA and the Office of Advocacy. If the
House version becomes law and includes "significant" as well as major
rules in the regulatory-analysis process, a potentially greater number of
rules will be subject both to the RFA and to the cost-benefit type of
regulatory analysis. Moreover, because the House bill replaces the reg-
ulatory agenda provisions of the RFA with its own regulatory-analysis
format, further conflict will exist.315
The primary difficulty with the proposed legislation from the Of-
fice of Advocacy's viewpoint is the clear shift of monitoring responsi-
bility from the Office of Advocacy to the OMB or other government
authorities.316 This proposed shift suggests that the current overlap in
responsibilities between the two organizations will be intensified; given
the OMB's stature, further attempts to narrow the Chief Counsel's role
in regulatory analysis seem inevitable. The Office of Advocacy, how-
ever, remains politically important and any bureaucratic attempt to re-
duce its authority could create rumblings of support for the Office in
Congress.317
Thus, the ultimate effect that enactment of generic regulatory-
analysis legislation will have on the RFA is difficult to calculate. In
some ways the recognition of regulatory analysis throughout govern-
ment should have a positive effect on the regulatory-flexibility process.
Agencies will become better trained to conduct regulatory analyses and
more comfortable with concepts such as "tiering" that are of special
importance to small entities. The small business community may
worry that general reforms will tend to subordinate the special interests
of small business to the overall interests of business generally, but
whether Congress or the courts will permit this leveling effect to occur
remains to be seen.
315. See H.R. 746, supra note 301, at § 63 1, which eliminates section 602 of the RFA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 602 (Supp. IV 1980) (dealing with the regulatory agenda). The House bill would require the
RFA to embrace the general regulatory agenda provisions of the new legislation. This approach
certainly will reduce duplication and redundancy, but it will also eliminate special notice to small
entities unless the Chief Counsel monitors and reports such agendas to small entities.
316. H.R. 746 gives control to OMB and the Comptroller General, but S. 1080 speaks in terms
of the President or his designee. It is not inconceivable that the "designee" could in some situa-
tions become the Chief Counsel for Advocacy and thereby ensure a continued role for that Office
and for the RFA. See 127 CONG. Rac. S12,318 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1981) (remarks of Senator
Nunn).
317. Such support has already emerged in the form of an amendment to S. 1080 offered by
Senator Nunn which would return control for implementation of the RFA to the Chief Counsel
for Advocacy, thereby depriving the President of any option to place RFA oversight in OMB or
other executive departments. See 127 CONG. REc. S12,318-19 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1981).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The RFA is a significant legislative achievement for small busi-
ness. Given the current state of generic regulatory reform, the ultimate
impact of the RFA is difficult to predict. Several factors, however, are
currently observable that will aid in determining the RFA's impor-
tance. One factor is the effectiveness of the entity that must implement
the RFA, the Office of Advocacy. The Office, if it carefully manages its
power to react decisively to questionable certifications and weak analy-
ses, can gain the attention of the agencies that must respond initially to
the RFA's requirements.
Careful management requires not only a consolidation of efforts
concerning the certifications and the IRFA's, but also an ability to
work effectively with the OMB. Despite its preoccupation with other
regulatory-reform legislation, the OMB can provide the expertise nec-
essary to assist the Office of Advocacy in becoming an effective over-
sight agency.
More importantly, the provisions of the RFA concerning judicial
review deserve the Chief Counsel's attention. Although the RFA
clearly does not contemplate an assertive judicial role in enforcing
agency compliance with regulatory-flexibility analysis, there are ways
in which the Chief Counsel can effectively intervene to alert the courts
to the RFA and thereby increase agency incentives for compliance. Fi-
nally, the Chief Counsel's reports to Congress and to the President can
alert those branches of government to the importance of implementing
the RFA.
Small business expects much from the RFA, perhaps too much.
The RFA does make agencies aware of the plight of small business,
and this awareness can influence rulemaking proceedings just as it in-
fluenced congressional action. The RFA is special-interest legislation
with a balance: it urges agencies to recognize differences in size when
promulgating rules, but it does not undermine the agency's regulatory
authority derived from organic legislation. Thus, while the RFA may
not be all the small business community desires, it contains the seeds
for producing workable compromises between government and the pri-
vate sector and it does not pose unreasonable burdens on the adminis-
trative process.
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